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TRIMMING THE IVY: A BICENTENNIAL
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
WIlLIAM C. PORTH*

ROBERT

P.

GEORGE**

INTRODUCTION

A little to the north and east of Charlottesville, in Orange County,
Virginia, on the property of a modern winery, stands the remains
of a great house. It was designed around 1814 by that American
polymath, Thomas Jefferson, for his friend James Barbour, diplomat, United States Senator, Secretary of War, and Governor of
the Commonwealth of Virginia.' Today the house is a desolate ruin.
The imposing bulk of the decayed lower stories and a few clusters
of broken columns attest to a grandeur that can now only be imagined. Ivy trails luxuriantly over the wreckage.
James Barbour's mansion is not the only artifact of the early
years of the Republic and the genius of its founders, the original
fabric of which is covered by. an unmanageable growth, as of ivy.
A far more important artifact in this class is the foundational instrument of our government, the Constitution of the United States.
In one respect, the Constitution is in much better shape than Governor Barbour's house; words can outlast the strongest brick and
stone. But, even though the words of the Constitution survive exactly
as our forefathers wrote them, they have, over the course of two
centuries, become so encrusted with the ivy of judicial interpretation
as to have become, in parts, almost wholly obscured.

* B.A. 1978, Washington & Lee University; J.D. 1981, Harvard University; partner in the
firm of Robinson & McElwee, Charleston, West Virginia.
** Assistant Professor of Public Law and Jurisprudence, Department of Politics, Princeton
University; B.A. 1977, Swarthmore College; M.T.S. 1981, Harvard University; J.D. 1981, Harvard
University; D. Phil. 1986, Oxford University; member of the bars of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
I Labels on bottle No. 1768 of the Barboursville Vineyards 1980 Virginia Pinot Chardonnay
in author's collection; 5 NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA oF AmERicAN BIOGRAPHY 82 (1907).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

In this, the Constitution's bicentennial year, perhaps the most
fitting mark of respect we can pay to the charter which has given
our nation its legal and political form is to strip away some of this
ivy. We should adopt as the chief object of our attention the words
of the Constitution itself, instead of Professor Piffle's commentary
on Mr. Justice Snort's landmark opinion interpreting this clause or
that.
It is certainly not our intention to derogate either scholarship or
the accrued body of judicial wisdom. Scholarship can play a useful
role in interpreting and applying constitutional provisions. Precedent
is essential to the orderly development and the stability of law in
general and constitutional law in particular. But either scholarship
or precedent can go awry, and, when either does, it invites correction. In the field of scholarship, this invitation should never be declined; scholarship's sole legitimate devotion is to the discovery and
dissemination of the truth. Precedents embodying or built upon faulty
interpretations should also be corrected - unless there are powerful
countervailing considerations. In rare cases it may be more important that the applied law be settled than that it be correct. But both
scholarship and precedent are subsidiary to, and must be respectful
of, the words of the Constitution itself. Just as the most radically
dissenting Roman Catholic theologian, qua theologian, is (or ought
to be) constrained by and faithful to the magisterium of the Roman
Catholic Church, 2 the most politically active and extreme federal
judge or professor of constitutional law, qua interpreter of the Constitution, is (or ought to be) constrained by and faithful to the Constitution.
It is our objective in this article to undertake a fresh examination
of one constitutional provision, the establishment clause of the first
amendment, by focusing on the plain meaning of the clause. We
shall first consider the task of constitutional interpretation in general
and attempt to identify the method of interpretation which is most
faithful to the Constitution. Then we shall review the establishment
clause jurisprudence of the past several decades, note where it has
2 G. GRsuZ, 1 THE WAY OF THE LORD JEsus (CIMSTAN MOaAL PRINCIPLES) 871-98 (1983).
See also infra note 10.
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gone astray, and offer a corrective interpretation. We shall then
examine a particular establishment clause case which is both recent
and controversial, the Mobile County textbooks case, 3 and evaluate
the reasoning and outcome of that case in light of both conventional
establishment clause jurisprudence and the reading of the clause which
we propose. Finally, we shall suggest an alternative mode of analysis
based upon a general principle of even-handedness (freely derivable
from either the establishment clause or the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment) which can be applied to many cases
which have customarily been analyzed (and frequently poorly decided) under a faulty reading of the establishment clause.
THE TASK OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The Constitution has several basic purposes. It creates the central
structures of our national government; 4 it authorizes those structures
to perform certain tasks and wield certain-' powers; 5 it reserves to
the people, and the various state governments instituted by them,
6
any powers not expressly conferred upon the federal government;
and it recognizes the especial protected status (against infringement
by federal and state governments) of certain basic rights, privileges,
and immunities of the people. The Constitution does other things
as well. For example, it places certain restrictions (unrelated to individual rights) on state governments, both explicitly and implicitly; 8
and it provides a mechanism deliberately slow and cumbersome for

its own amendment. 9
In the degree of specificity which it employs, the Constitution
takes a middle course. It is far more detailed than a mere statement
of broad ideals such as "the aim of government is to do justice"
or "government must not trespass on the rights of the people." On
I Smith v. Board of School Commr's, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d
684 (11th Cir. 1987).
4 U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, and III.
,Id.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
E.g., U.S. CoNST. amends. I - IX.
E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 and art. IV (explicitly); E.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 read
in conjunction with the enumerated powers conferred upon Congress by art. I (implicitly).
9 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the other hand, it is far more general than the statutes and regulations which the federal government has created in effectuation of
its various constitutional mandates. It is, as it were, the blueprint
of a great engine of government for a sovereign people. It is neither
the mere concept for such an engine, nor a plan of the specific work
which the engine will perform.
The engine was intended to be enduring. While the work which
it will undertake may be expected to change with changes in circumstances and changes in the political will of the people, modifications of the engine itself are rarely needed. It was for this reason
that the amendment process was made elaborate. It was also made
to require ratification by the people (through either their state legislatures or state constitutional conventions) so that the federal government alone could not alter the very restraints which the people
had placed upon it.
For the Constitution to work, two requirements must be fulfilled.
First, its operative provisions must be understood; second, they must
be obeyed. Only the first requirement is at all problematic. The
second is purely a matter of will. Men may genuinely differ about
the precise meaning of certain constitutional provisions. If they are
loyal to the Constitution, however, they cannot dispute that whatever it mandates must be performed and whatever it forbids must
be eschewed. Our governmental officials, for example, are bound
so to act by their solemn oaths. 0

30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 prescribes the oath of the President, which contains the promise to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl.3
requires United States senators and representatives, state legislators, and all federal and state executive
and judicial officers to be bound by oath "to support this Constitution." Curiously, the oath taken
by federal judges is unique among the oaths taken by government officials in containing no express
commitment to support or defend the Constitution. The judicial oath of office reads, in pertinent
part: "I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to
the rich, and . ..I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent
upon me . . .according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution
and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 453. Of course, even this weaker formulation requires
a judge to promise to act in conformity with the Constitution. If anyone were to argue that the form
of the judicial oath confers upon judges a special license to manipulate or disregard constitutional
provisions, he would merely be making a case for the unconstitutionality of the statute prescribing
the oath.
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One might wish to suppose that willful infidelity to the Constitution would be rare, and when it occurred, would be speedily
redressed through the process of impeachment. 1 However, the matter is not so simple. The desire to have the Constitution mean what
one would like it to mean can tempt one to disregard what one
knows it to mean. More insidiously, it can distort one's actual understanding of what it does mean. Finally, beyond these cases of
culpable misunderstanding (whether conscious or unconscious), there
can be honest, though not always reasonable, disagreement about
the meaning of the Constitution and, even more to the point, about
the purpose of the Constitution. One or another of these phenomena
is variously responsible for the changing, and increasingly idiosyncratic, reading of the Constitution engaged in by the federal judiciary.
It is odd that it should be so. Certain forms of literature are
intentionally obscure, ambiguous, or rich with multiple meanings.
A written constitution, by contrast, is a form of literature which,
by its very nature, aims at clear communication. Ambiguity is no
more desirable in a constitution than it is in a road sign or a railway
timetable. To be useful, the admonition "No passing" to a motorist
should be as plain as it can be; so should the admonition "No
12
passing of a Bill of Attainder" to the Congress.
The concept of a written constitution as an effective restraint
upon the actions of generation after generation of willful men entrusted with the power of the state requires the initial assumption
that ideas can be given clear verbal formulations. It posits the mutual
practical efforts of the skillful writer and the intelligent and receptive
reader. There may be skeptics who deny the possibility of any such
communication. But if it is an impossibility, the rest of the apparatus
of our constitutional law is a chimera. If the draftsmen of a constitution cannot reasonably aspire to convey a clear message to readers of their own, or a later, generation, how can a lawyer hope to
present a rational argument to a judge, and how can a judicial
opinion give any meaningful direction to anyone?

" U.S. CONST. art.
12 U.S. CONST. art.

II, § 4.
I, § 9, c. 3.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Beginning with this fundamental premise about the nature of
constitutional communication, and turning to the text of our own
Constitution, we discover no textual evidence that the framers deliberately courted ambiguity. An unprejudiced reading of the document conveys the impression that each point was set down as clearly
and specifically as its subject matter allowed. What, then, is the
source of the ambiguity which has permitted so many judges and
theorists to come to so many different conclusions about the meaning of the same words? In some instances, one must admit, a particular subject matter calls for a certain breadth of concept and of
phrasing. "Freedom of speech," for example, is a constitutional
formulation the precise content of which is neither set forth in the
first amendment nor immediately understood as a matter of the
common vocabulary shared by speakers of the English tongue. Recourse must be made to some extra-textual source to understand and
apply the protection against the abridgment of this freedom. Similarly, the concept of cruelty referred to in the eighth amendment
or the understanding of what process is "due" under the fourteenth
amendment before a person may be deprived of life, liberty, or
-property, are matters which require independent ethical reflection
and determination on the part of anyone faced with the task of
applying those constitutional provisions.
Instances of the use of words and concepts of this character in
the Constitution are not infrequent. Yet they remain an occasional,
not a pervasive, phenomenon. Often the Constitution addresses a
subject, if sometimes only in part, in words that, given their plain
and common meaning (considered in the verbal and structural context in which they occur), yield the clearest possible message. Section
1 of the fourteenth amendment is a provision of this composite
character. While it contains a number of phrases which must be
imbued with content from outside the four corners of the Constitution, it has an obvious symmetrical structure and a basic verbal
formulation which conveys, and should be accorded, its plain meaning - and within which the content of the more elusive phrases can
be sought and then applied in a manner which accords the amendment no less verbal rigor than it actually contains. 3 All too often,
" In the specific case of the fourteenth amendment,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
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however, the presence in a constitutional provision of any word or
phrase of less than crystalline clarity has been exploited by "interpreters" as justification for treating the entire provision as ambiguous. We object to such obscurantism.
The proper methodological approach of a constitutional interpreter might be analogized roughly to that of a physician confronted

focused on and developed in isolation, the words taken as merely a starting point for an elaborate
jurisprudence which has only the slightest rooting in the text. Here are the actual words of the three
key clauses:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
It is not our purpose in this article to advance or defend in any kind of detail our understanding
of the plain meaning of the fourteenth amendment. However, for the sake of illustrating our general
theory of constitutional interpretation, we will set forth very briefly that understanding. The three
clauses above are directed to the functions assigned to the three branches of government. The privileges
and immunities clause is directed to the substantive content of laws; it prohibits state legislatures from
enacting (and state executives from enforcing) laws which infringe upon the various privileges and
immunities of individual citizens. The equal protection clause is directed to the enforcement of laws;
it requries state executives to enforce laws in a fair, impartial, and even-handed fashion. The due
process clause is directed to the proper conduct of adjudicatory proceedings (and, although the tremendous expansion of administrative law in the twentieth century was unquestionably not foreseen
by the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment, the protections of the due process clause
are reasonably and necessarily extended to the proper conduct of quasi-adjudicatory proceedings, as
well); it requires judges (and members of the quasi-adjudicatory panels of administrative agencies) to
afford a person adequate procedural safeguards before he may be required to suffer such sanctions
as fine, confiscation, imprisonment, or execution.
An acceptance of this plain meaning clearly leaves much to be decided by a court faced with
the task of applying any of three key clauses of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. Judgments
must be made about the substantive content of "privileges and immunities" and "due process" and
the dividing line between, inter alia, prosecutorial discretion and discriminatorily selective application
of laws. But the plain meaning approach takes us a helpful distance down the road principled interpretation; unlike conventional readings of the fourteenth amendment, it doesn't leave us directionless at the crossroads, ready, out of either hubris or despair, to conclude that the fourteenth
amendment contains some vague and high-sounding phrases and that we should apply our inventiveness
to creating appealing standards, of constitutional force, which can be associated with those phrases.
Neither of the authors of this article is, by training or inclination, an historian. We arrived at
the plain meaning outlined in this note by a close reading and analysis of the constitutional text, and
nothing else. One author first suggested this reading to the other in 1979 or 1980. It has come to
our attention that this same reading has been arrived at by Michael Zuckert on the basis of historical
research and analysis and advanced in his doctoral dissertation and other unipublished work. Although
we are unaware of the nature or persuasiveness of this historical proof, its existence constitutes an
example of the way in which the "plain meaning" method of constitutional interpretation can be
affirmed in some instances by sound historiography. A description of the Zuckert thesis may be found
in Berns, The Constitution as Bill of Rights, in How Doas THE CONSTITUrION SEcURE RIGHTs 50,
67-68 (1985).
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with a patient who has a mysterious ailment. The physician should
first perform a physical examination and, if needed, conduct a battery of diagnostic tests. In many cases these efforts will enable him
to make a confident diagnosis. However, if his patient's ailment
remains mysterious, he may then have to engage in more imaginative
or speculative analysis. But he should never ignore the initial and
fundamental steps of diagnosis and proceed directly to the recondite
stage. Similarly, a constitutional interpreter should never forego a
textual analysis of a provision of the Constitution and an effort to
discern its plain meaning on the grounds that such efforts will not
ultimately resolve all conceivable questions about that provision.
It is not our purpose to probe the psychology of constitutional
obscurantists. We are willing to suppose that (in all but the queerest
cases) their motivation is not ill-will toward the Constitution or any
kind of intellectual bad faith, but, in all likelihood, an undiscriminating devotion to furthering what they perceive to be the larger
purposes of the document at the expense of its own clear statements.
This enterprise, while not ignoble, fundamentally misconceives a basic purpose of the Constitution - prior restraint of government by
the governed. It sets up the judiciary as a law unto itself, a branch
of government immeasurably superior to the other branches and
empowered to impose its own philosophy, and thereby its untem14
pered political will, upon the people.
There is a lively debate over the good and bad effects of allowing
courts to create fundamental law in the constitutional context. Our
point is simply that, good or bad, such a system is not the system
created by our Constitution. Under that system, the Congress makes
laws, the Congress and state legislatures (or constitutional conventions) make (by amendment) the Constitution, and the federal courts
14

The literature arguing against this state of affairs (i.e., government by an activist judiciary)

and demonstrating it to be either unwise or anti-constitutional, or both, is vast. One of the most
eloquent expressions predates the ratification of the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). For a few other notable examples, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANs.
FORMATION OF THE FotRanTH AMENDMENT 283-99 (1977); J. AoREsTo, THE SUPREME COURT AND

CoNsTrrtmoxAL DEMOCRACY 163-65 (1984); Bems, The Least Dangerous Branch but Only If, in Tan
JUDIcIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SocIrr (1979). Not all who make the case against government by judiciary are political conservatives. E.g., Finnis, A Bill of Rights for Britain? The Moral of Conteinporary Jurisprudence, 71 PROCEEDINGS OF TnE BRITISH ACADEMY 303, 328-31 (1985).
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interpret both constitutional and statutory provisions and apply them

to the facts of the cases or controversies which properly come before
them. The courts have also assumed the power to test the acts of

all three branches of government against the Constitution and to
invalidate them when they are inconsistent with the courts' interpretation of that document."

How should the courts go about their task of interpretation?
Surprisingly, and disappointingly, this is more than a rhetorical
question. Although one would expect the individuality of human
intelligence to produce a certain (but limited) degree of variability
in the interpretations arrived at by different interpreters, one could
legitimately expect them to share, at least on a fairly basic level, a
common conception of the task in which they are engaged. But this
is not the case.
The classification of interpretive theories is a favorite pursuit of
contemporary constitutional scholarship. So it is that the literature
of constitutional studies has evolved such creatures as strict and
liberal constructionists,' 6 originalists and non-originalists, 17 textual-

ists,18 textual determinists,

9

structuralists, 2° immanent structural-

" E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This power is nowhere expressly
conferred upon the courts by the Constitution. The points ordinarily advanced in support of the
constitutionality of the power itself are (a) the early date of its annunication by the Supreme Court,
(b) contemporary theoretical justifications of the concept of judicial review in The Federalist and the
constitutional debates, and (c) the necessitarian argument that, without it, any branch of government
could transgress against the Constitution with impunity and deprive the Constitution of its restraining
power - except insofar as each branch is willing to exercise self-restraint. We shall not consider here
the purely academic question of the constitutionality of the courts' power to declare unconstitutional
the acts of co-equal branches of government. However, it should be noted that the strongest argument
in favor of the constitutionality of the power (the necessitarian one) is a two-edged sword: once the
courts had assumed this power, the integrity of the Constitution was no longer dependent on the
self-restraint of all three branches of government; it became precariously dependent on the self-restraint
of the judicial branch alone. whether or not this is the scheme contemplated by the Constitution
(and the very novelty of the scheme supports the argument that, if contemplated, it would have been
expressly addressed), it is a sad and obvious fact that our judges have frequently failed to exercise
the philosophical modesty needed to make it work. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
,6 L. TRmE, GOD SAvE Tins HONORABLE CoURT 41-49 (1985).
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. R.v. 204 (1980).
, Grey, Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. Rav. 1 (1984).
" Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 743 (1982).
20Harris, Bonding Word and Polity, 76 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 34, 37 (1982).
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transcendent structuralists,22 historicists,23 intentionalists,24
supplementers,25 aspirationalists,26 positivists,27 process theorists,28
ists,21

aesthetic theorists, 29 distributivists,30 rejectionists, 3' literalists, 32 court
skeptics and rights skeptics, 33 neutral principles theorists, 34 preservatists, 35 activitists and passivists,3 6 constructivists, 37 and the list goes
on.

Perhaps the most familiar classificatory division is between interpretivists and non-interpretivists. 3 It is probably also the least
useful. Interpretivism, as described by John Hart Ely, holds "that
judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to

enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
constitution.' '39 Non-interpretivism, on the other hand, authorizes
courts to "go beyond that set of inferences and enforce norms that
cannot be discovered within the four corners of that document." 40
Ely further distinguishes between clause-bound and non-clause-bound
interpretivists.41

Of course, non-interpretive theories are really not theories of
constitutional interpretation at all. They do share with theories of
21

Id.

at 39.

21

Id.

at 41.

2

R. DwoiRuu,
LAw's EMInuE 359 (1987).
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUI4cIARY: TnE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-

MENT 21 (1977).
2 Grey, supra note 18, at 1.
E.g., S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEAs (1984).
2 Harris, supra note 20, at 37.
28 E.g., J.ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
2 E.g., L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKINo 165 (1985).
3.E.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - and Its Future, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 223
(1981).
31 Grey, supra note 18, at 2.
31Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in ConstitutionalLaw: JudicialReview and Democratic Theory,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1089 (1979).
33 D. RicHARDs, TOLERATION AND TBE CONSTITUTION 4-6 (1986).
E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
31L. CARTER, supra note 29, at 41.
3 R. DwoRKin,
supra note 23, at 369-78.
37 Id.

3 Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 705 (1975).

3:J. ELY, supra note 28, at 1.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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interpretation a normative concern for judicial practice. They differ,
however, in proposing no method for discerning the meanings, or
guiding the applications, of constitutional provisions or the constitutional document as a whole. By their own terms, they seek to
guide or justify judicial choice and action by reference to something
entirely outside the scope of the constitutional document. Non-interpretivists apparently see no point in attempting to guide judicial
choice and action by reference to principles set forth in the Constitution. Even if they might concede that the Constitution contains
some coherent principles, they fear that these principles are not up
to the task of resolving serious constitutional disputes. In giving up
on constitutional interpretation, however, non-interpretivists abandon faith in the Constitution as law.
Few constitutional scholars (and seemingly no judges) today wish
to be categorized as non-interpretivists. 42 The term has acquired a
definite air of opprobrium. Although there are radically different

views among constitutional specialists about how the Constitution
ought to be interpreted, virtually all claim to have identified the
theory which is able to produce authentic interpretations. Hence the

long list of interpretive theories set out above. Even those who would
go furthest "beyond the document" in their search for meaning

claim constitutional authority for their journeys and characterize
their quest as a search for constitutional meaning.
While we are committed to the "plain meaning" approach to
the task of interpretation, we by no means disdain constitutional

theory. Indeed, our conclusion that courts should, to the fullest
extent possible, give effect to the plain meaning of constitutional

provisions is grounded in what seems to us to be the best under42 Even a judge as unfettered by the text of the Constitution as Justice Brennan gainsays in
theoretical discourse the implications of his judicial practices: "Justices are not platonic guardians
appointed to wield authority according to their personal moral predilections." Speech by Justice
William J. Brennan at Georgetown University, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratificatin (Oct. 12, 1985). One of the handful of scholars frank enough to proclaim his adherence
to non-interpretivism is Michael Perry. See M. PERRY, THE CoNsT=rioN: Tim COURT Am HuMAN
RiOlrrs (1982). Ronald Dworkin, with characteristic ingenuity, argues that there is no meaningful
distinction between interpretivists and non-interpretivists, but that, to the extent they differ at all, it
is the interpretivists who are really non-interpretivist, and vice-versa. R. DwoRxsN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 34-37 (1985).
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standing of the point of the Constitution - in other words, in a
constitutional theory. Moreover, we recognize that the meanings of
various elements of the Constitution are not immediately plain and
that, with respect to these elements, courts are required to make
authoritative choices within more or less circumscribed ranges of
possibilities. In these areas, certain constitutional theories usefully
guide the choice and action of the constitutional interpreter. They
do so, not by replacing the authoritative choices reflected in the
Constitution, but by illuminating these choices. For example, structuralist theories frequently help to make plain the meanings of provisions which, when considered in abstraction from the structures
and structural relations of the Constitution, could seem thoroughly
ambiguous. The fact that the meanings of certain provisions (e.g.,
as we shall demonstrate, the establishment clause) can be identified
without resort to complex structural analysis provides no basis for
concluding that there are not other provisions, the meaning of which
may be inaccessible without the aid of such analysis. 43 On the other
hand, the detection of ambiguity anywhere in the Constitution is
no justification for concluding that the document does not provide,
at other points, unambiguous directives. Constitutional theories go
awry, however, precisely to the extent that they send the interpreter
off on an unauthorized quest for extra-constitutional standards for
decision-making.
Of the interpretive theories rooted in a perception that proper
constitutional interpretation should be highly attentive to, and respectful, of the text of the Constitution itself, the most prominent
currently is the theory of "framers' intent" or "original intent."
According to this theory, the fundamental task of a judge confronted with a constitutional question must be to discern the intention of the framers and ratifiers of the constitutional provision
at issue. It is their intention which will resolve any uncertainty as
to correct meaning and which will provide guidance as to the proper
application of the Constitution to the factual situation at hand.To
all but the most ardent neoterist, "framers' intent" is an appealing

41

See supra note 13.
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theory. It assures a measure of permanence, consistency, and rootedness in the task of constitutional interpretation. (Indeed, it may
succeed too well in this direction and result in a rigid, ossified Constitution.) It clearly serves, however, to protect the Constitution from
becoming a mere vessel of words into which each successive generation of federal judges pours the wine of its own philosophical
(whether political, moral, or economic) predispositions.
But there is a critical problem with the theory of "original intent" if it is used to authorize a search for that intent beyond the
text of the Constitution in the minds of the framers and ratifiers.
Such a use misdirects our attention from something unitary, definite,
and permanent - the constitutional text - to something diverse,
indefinite, and changeable - the minds of (at the very least) hundreds of men. There are several different senses of intent, most of
which are indeterminable, misleading, or irrelevant. The legitimate
sense of intent as a principled guide to constitutional interpretation
is simply "the intended meaning of the text." This "intent," however, is often overshadowed by other notions of "intent" which are
incapable of providing principled guidance.
First, there is the motive of individual framers and ratifiers in
approving the particular formulations contained in the Constitution.
It is a virtual certainty that different framers and ratifiers acted out
of different motives. What all of those motives may have been would
be impossible to discover today due to the incompleteness of the
extant historical records - even if one made the questionable assumption that every surviving recorded expression of the views of
a framer or ratifier was a complete and accurate reflection of his
motivation in casting his vote. Even more to the point, it is supremely irrelevant why someone chose to vote for a particular constitutional provision. One man may have voted to protect his business,
another to annoy his rival, a third to be faithful to his conscience.
Some votes may have been whole-hearted, some grudging, some the
product of compromise. Given the fact of human individuality, if
the voting process required not only agreement of result but also
agreement of motivation, democracy would be impossible. In the
final analysis, it matters only how the voters voted, not why they
voted as they did.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987
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Second there is the personal philosophy of individual framers
and ratifiers on the subject matter addressed by particular constitutional provisions which they approved. Such philosophies may
comport more or less closely with the content of the Constitution.
Obviously, a man may decide to vote for something which falls short
of his ideal; most practical politicians are masters of the art of
compromise. But a decision to compromise does not necessitate, and
perhaps only rarely reflects, a change in personal philosophy on the
part of the maker of that decision. Typically, the attitude of a compromiser could accurately be portrayed as "Although I would rather
have X, I am willing, under the circumstances, to accept Y." This
simple fact of life generates manifold problems for most seekers of
original intent. The extra-constitutional materials on which they often rely - such materials as A's diary, B's letter to a friend, C's
transcribed or summarized speech - are far more likely to reflect
the personal philosophies of such artifacts' authors than their disinterested interpretations of constitutional provisions. Even in cases
where the materials expressly purport to be a reading of the Constitution, they may often convey more of the authors' prescriptive
beliefs about what the Constitution should say than their impartial
descriptive assessments of what it does say. We see this temptation
succumbed to frequently enough by judges, whose sole charge is the
task of interpretation; how much more powerful a temptation must
it be to men who were themselves creators of the Constitution.
Third, there is an individual'sperception of the intended meaning
of a text - which is not necessarily coincident with its intended
meaning. Different people possess intellectual gifts of different kinds
and in different degrees; they also may devote different levels of
attention and reflection to the projects in which they engage including the project of drafting and approving the provisions of a
constitution. As a result, there may well be, as an objective fact,
a variation in the subjective perceptions of individual framers and
ratifiers about the intended meaning of the very provisions they have
approved. Ronald Dworkin has advanced with some subtlety and
precision the argument that there is no such thing as the framers'
intent (at least- in many cases) because of the multifarious psychological states of the individuals involved in the collective acts of
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framing and ratifying the constitution. 44 With regard to one aspect
of psychological state motivation we find nothing telling in this argument, not because there is likely to be any motivational consensus,
but because, as we have discussed above, motivation is irrelevant.
With regard to another aspect of psychological state,-however - a
framer's or ratifier's understanding of the meaning of what he is
approving - Dworkin makes a telling point. Just as the collective
act of creating a contract requires a meeting of the minds, it would
seem that the collective acts of legislators and constitution-makers
require some threshold level of shared understanding to make them
valid and purposive, instead of accidental and meaningless. In the
final analysis, however, this is only a philosopher's quibble, if an
intriguing one. As a practical matter, it will never, or almost never,
be determinable whether the requisite level of shared understanding
has or has not been reached in a particular instance. In the absence
of compelling evidence, why adopt Dworkin's pessimistic assumption
that the shared understanding is lacking? One would do better to
assume that men of at least ordinary intelligence can understand
most expressions aimed at clearly communicating ideas. If one is so
thoroughly skeptical about human capacities for comprehension and
communication that one cannot accept that assumption, one might
as well crawl into a cave. It would, in any event, be irrational for
such a skeptic to write articles, engage in public debate, perform
the duties of a professor,. or accept appointment as a judge.
The three senses of intent considered above (motive, personal
philosophy, and individual perception) are not useful guides to constitutional meaning. To the extent that an interpretive theory focuses
upon any of them, it will be unreliable. The intent of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers cannot be meaningfully discerned apart
from a study of the only artifact which can be regarded as accurately
reflecting that intent - the text of the Constitution itself. 45 And,

" R. DwoIxm, supra note 42, at 43-48.
41 H. Jefferson Powell turns the tables on the "original intent" theorists in an entirely different
way by attempting to demonstrate through the same sort of detailed historical analysis in which they
engage that the framers' and ratifiers' original understanding of the concept of original intent was
something quite different, and more flexible, than the understanding of its modern proponents. The
neat paradox of his analysis is only telling, however, against those who believe that this sort of
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to the extent that a "framers' intent" theory focuses upon the text,
it should be virtually indistinguishable from the "plain meaning"
approach.
In our view, textual analysis is the single most important, and
most neglected, technique of constitutional interpretation. It strikes
us as curious that, in an age when textualism (of one form or another) is the sole respectable method of literary analysis, students
of the Constitution should persist in attempting to find the meaning
of their text in the biographical details and extra-textual literary
remains of its authors. (We use the word "authors" here in a very
broad sense to include all those who participated in the framing or
ratifying of the Constitution and its amendments.) Indeed, there
would ironically seem to be far more justification for attempts at
extra-textual historical investigation in the case of a work of sole
authorship such as a poem or a novel (where it is uniformly eschewed) than in the case of a work of collective authorship such as
the Constitution (where it is a respectable, although not the dominant, approach). Keats's letters, for example, can actually give us
reliable information about the circumstances of the composition of
particular poems, the message or effect for which the poet strove,
and his personal literary theories. By contrast, the collected writings
of Madison or Jefferson on religious freedom and the relationship
between church and state are likely, for the reasons discussed above,
to give us little more than some insights (perhaps quite interesting
and historically significant in their own right) into the views of Madison or Jefferson and even those, only at the times at which, and
in the various contexts in which, they happened to be writing.
The best approach to constitutional interpretation therefore seems
to us to focus initially and primarily on the text, to rely upon the
technique of textual analysis, to restrict the role of extra-textual
historiography to the use of materials which bear reliably on explication of the text (e.g., the contemporary meaning of certain

historical approach is actually useful in discerning the framers' intent. In fact, Powell's analysis is
subject to the very criticisms we have made of the original intent approaches which focus inadequately
on the constitutional text. Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HA .v. L. REv.
885 (1985).
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words, the contemporary practices and institutions of society, and
the record of collective acts respecting the text - such as the acceptance and rejection of amendments and alternative formulations),
and to be devoted in an intellectually humble and respectful spirit
to the discernment (wherever possible) of the plain meaning of the
Constitution from its text. This is what we mean when we refer to
the "plain meaning" approach. This is what has never been applied
by the Supreme Court in its establishment clause jurisprudence.
WRONG FROM THE START:

A BRIEF REVIEW OF ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

One need not search far for the origins of contemporary establishment clause doctrine. They are to be found in the first Supreme
Court case devoted primarily to construing that clause, Everson v.
Board of Education.46 The question before the Court in Everson
was whether public funds could be used to pay for transporting
children to and from parochial schools. A bare majority of the justices found in this practice no violation of the establishment clause,
as extended to apply to the states by the fourteenth amendment. 47
Curiously, however, Justice Black, writing for the Court, justified
this result by arguing that public funding of transportation of
schoolchildren to and from parochial school did not constitute "aid"
to religion. 48 Were it otherwise, according to Black, there would
indeed be an establishment clause violation. In Black's words:
The 'establishment of religion clause' of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
9
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.4

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
, None of the justices disputed in Everson Justice Black's conclusion that the fourteenth amendment had incorporated the establishment clause and applied it to the states. It is questionable whether
this conclusion has ever received adequate reflective attention from the Supreme Court. As we discuss,
infra, the plain meaning of the establishment clause provides a strong logical argument against its
incorporability.
4 Perhaps even more curiously, many years later the Supreme Court would prohibit, on establishment clause grounds, the public funding of transportation for non-religious field trips for parochial school students without overruling Everson. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977).
"1 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
46
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It is therefore obvious that Black, and the justices joining in his
opinion, understood the words "make no law respecting an establishment of religion" to preclude any aid, even non-discriminatory
aid, to religions.
Historically, the leading alternative to the "no-aid" (or "strict
separationist") interpretation of the establishment clause has been
the "no-sect-preference" (or "non-preferentialist") interpretation.
No-sect-preference means that governmental aid to religions is permissible under the establishment clause so long as it is even-handed.
No religion may be, arbitrarily, singled out for special favors or
excluded from governmental aid.
The dissenting justices in Everson stressed the respects in which
providing children with transportation to and from parochial schools
does, in fact, aid the religious mission of such schools. In light of
this, they argued, the establishment clause, interpreted as forbidding
any such aid, rendered unconstitutional the publicly-funded transportation services at issue in Everson.5 0 The logic of this argument
seems unassailable. It is difficult to understand how the majority
squared its no-aid interpretation with its willingness to uphold the
challenged state assistance.
On the other hand, the Everson majority could clearly have justified its result under a no-sect-preference interpretation. Such an
interpretation had been vigorously urged upon the Court in briefs
and oral argument.5' It is therefore interesting to ask why the majority felt compelled to reject such an interpretation, joining instead
with the dissenting justices in adopting the no-aid reading. If we
take Justice Black's opinion at face value, the answer would seem
to be that the justices were persuaded that the history of the framing
and ratification of the establishment clause provided powerful evidence for the no-aid interpretation.
Black's historical analysis begins with a discussion of the intolerance and religious persecution which settlers in America had imported from Europe.5 2 Recognizing the problems of strife and
10Id. at

18-63 (dissenting opinions).

11 G. BRADLEY, C-JRCH-STATE RELATIONS-MS IN AMERICA
12 Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-10.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
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injustice portended by this situation, Black argues, the statesmen of
the day decided to ban governmental aid to religion as a matter of
constitutional law. 5 According to Black, the prohibition of laws
"respecting an establishment of religion" reflects the views of Thomas
Jefferson, as embodied, for example, in his Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.5 4 He finds the spirit of the establishment clause to be
encapsulated in Jefferson's metaphor of a "wall of separation" between church and state. The intent of the framers and ratifiers, Black
' 55
contends, was to erect exactly such a "wall.
Writing in dissent, Justice Rutledge echoed Black in stressing the
relevance of Jefferson's Virginia Bill. His historical analysis differs
from Black's mainly in attributing more influence to (or at least
exhibiting a greater deference toward) the opinions of James Madison. According to Rutledge, Madison was the "author" of the
establishment clause, and it represents a "compact and exact" precis
of his putatively strict-separationist views.56
The majority and dissenting justices alike relied upon a straightforward original intent approach in explicating the establishment
clause. On the basis of their historical analyses, there was general
agreement among all nine justices that the intent of the framers was
to prevent any government aid to religion. The only disagreement
(among the justices) concerned the question of whether transportation to and from parochial schools amounted to "aid."
The historiography of the Everson opinions has, over the years,
been the subject of intense scholarly criticism. 57 Even critics who
share, to at least some extent, with the Everson justices a reliance
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-13.
" Id. at 16. We have previously warned of the dangers of looking to unreliable extra-constitutional sources for guidance in constitutional interpretation. Everson's reliance upon Jefferson's metaphor is a perfect object lesson in that it imports content into the Constitution from the views expressed
in an 1802 letter by a man who was neither a framer nor a ratifier of the Constitution.
6 Id. at 34-41.
7 An especially interesting re-evaluation of the origin and historical context of the establishment
"

4

clause stresses the failure of contemporary jurisprudence to attend to the rootedness of late 18thcentury American antiestablishmentarianism and beliefs in religious liberty in explicitly theological
ideas. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMoRY L.J.

777 (1986).
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upon historical analysis, maintain that the historical record reveals
that an overwhelming majority among the framers and ratifiers of
the first amendment were in favor of non-discriminatory aid to religions. 58 These critics make a compelling case. Even if we emphasize
those writings and actions of, say, Jefferson and Madison which
make them appear most sternly opposed to any governmental aid
to religion, such strict-separationist views would have placed them
in a tiny minority. 59 Moreover, modern scholarship is sharply divided
over Madison's role in the drafting of the establishment clause. 6°
On a considerably more important point, recently published historical research reveals an overwhelming agreement among participants in the debates surrounding the adoption of the religion clauses
that aid to religion, if even-handed, is not only appropriate but often
desirable. 6' If we follow the Everson Court in making the beliefs of
the framers about the relationship of church and state dispositive
of the dispute between the no-aid and no-sect-preference interpretations, we must conclude that all nine justices in Everson came
down on the wrong side.
Still, the historiography and reasoning of Everson has never been
repudiated by the Court. Thus, the no-aid principle functions as a
foundational premise of establishment clause doctrine. Very frequently

-

as in Everson itself

-

this leaves before the courts the

question of what is to count as "aid." Perhaps nowhere in its constitutional jurisprudence has the Supreme Court been less able to
produce consistent and defensible results. In the forty years since
Everson, the justices have thrashed about in search of a set of principles capable of generating a coherent body of case law. Now the
"' E.g., G. BRADLEY, supra note 51, at 1-18 & 121-34; R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 2-15 (1982); M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE

INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF Tm FIRsT AMENDMENT (1978); W. BERNS, THE FIRST AHENDMENT
AND Tm FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); McClellan, The Making and Unmaking of the
Establishment Clause, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUrDICIL REFORM (1981).
" Just how "strict" the "separationism" of Madison and Jefferson may have been is itself a

disputed matter. Compare, e.g., Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770, with R. Cord, supra note
58, at 17-47.
60 G. BRADLEY, supra note 51, at 87, 105 n.24.
63 Especially compelling is the historiography contained in G. BRADLEY, supra note 51, at 19-
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Court (in the persons of four of its eight sitting justices) appears
to be on the verge of abandoning its most recent candidate for the
job, the so-called "tripartite test" first announced in the 1971 case,
62
Lemon v. Kurtzman.
In order to survive attack as a violation of the establishment
clause under the Lemon test, a challenged statute, or other governmental act, must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) in its principal
or primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 63 The chief
objection to these criteria is their lack of any basis in the words of
the establishment clause. Nothing in the text requires the government
to act always for secular purposes; nothing forecloses the government from advancing or inhibiting religion in general, or one or
more religions in particular, either as a primary or subsidiary effect;
and nothing speaks to the possibility of government and religion
becoming entangled in constitutionally unacceptable ways.
In addition to being stitched together out of whole cloth, the
Lemon test has proven to be ludicrous in application. Justice Rehnquist is undoubtedly correct in his judgment that, as a mechanism
for making the no-aid interpretation yield principled results, this test
has failed miserably. Even restricting one's focus to a single category
of establishment clause cases, the so-called school services cases, one
finds the outcomes of challenges to the provision of goods and services to parochial school children under the Lemon criteria to be filled
with inconsistencies which appear to be both arbitrary and absurd:
For example, a State may lend to parochial schoolchildren geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the
United States for use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American
colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film

projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks,
but may not lend workbooks in which the parochial schoolchildren write, thus

rendering them nonreuseable. A State may pay for bus transportation to religious
schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the
public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. A state may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must

62

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).

63

Id. at 612-13.
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be given in a different building; speech and hearing 'services' conducted by the
State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
367, 371, 44 L.Ed.2d 217, 95 S.Ct. 1753 (1975), but the State may conduct speech
and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school. Wolman, 433 U.S. at
241, 53 L.Ed.2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 5 Ohio Ops.3d. 197. Exceptional parochial
school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the
parochial school, such as in a trailer parked down the street. Id. at 245, 53
L.Ed.2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 5 Ohio Ops.3d 197. A State may give cash to a
parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests and stateordered reporting services, but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests
on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in public school, but
the public school may release students during the day for religion classes elsewhere,
and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws.Y

We believe that the unsatisfactory results of the Lemon test are
directly traceable to flaws inherent in the test. The heart of Lemon,
and its most reasonable element, is the "effect" prong. The "pur-

pose" prong either adds nothing to the test or it authorizes a fundamentally unsound and unworkable investigation into legislative
motives. In Wallace v. Jaffree5 and Edwards v.Aguillard,66 a mo-

ment-of-silence statute and a balanced-curriculum statute, which
would evidently have been neutral in effect, were struck down under
the first prong of Lemon on the ground that each was the product
of an unconstitutional legislative intent. Indeed, the laws were invalidated on no stronger basis than the contention that certain individual legislators (as evidenced by their public utterances) had

unacceptable religious motives for introducing or voting for the challenged statutes. The implications of such a technique of judicial
review are alarming. Under the reasoning of Jaffree and Aguillard,
any of the civil rights acts of the nineteeth century or the 1960s

would be unconstitutional if it could be demonstrated that certain
congressmen supported them out of a religiously-based belief in the
brotherhood of man or the equality of the races. (This would, in
turn, raise the question of whether the judicial invalidation of such

laws on establishment clause grounds would itself amount to a vi6 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (dissenting opinion). For an interesting attempt
to identify a "norm" unifying the disparate results in these cases in the judicial aversion to the symbolic
union of church and state, see Marshall, "We Know It When We See It". The Supreme Court and
Establishment 59 S. CAL. L. Ray. 495 (1986).
Wallace, 472 U.S. 38.
" Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (1987).
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olation of the constitutional rights of those congressmen under the
free exercise clause.) And, of course, the principle need not be restricted to the religion clauses. Perhaps the Supreme Court could
strike down a welfare statute because some legislators who voted
for it did so out of racial animus, believing that it would weaken
the structure of the black nuclear family. Let us take the approach
of Jaffree and Aguillard yet a step further. If it can be applied to
do away with laws approved for improper reasons, why should it
not also be applied to justify the judicial resuscitation of bills which
failed to become laws if enough legislators had unacceptable motives
in voting against them?
In applying the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has attempted
to make the "purpose" prong meaningful by collapsing statutory
purpose into legislative motive, indeed, into individual legislators'
motives. In our view, an inquiry into motivation (in any legal context, not merely an establishment clause review) can ordinarily be
justified only in two ways, the first of which is obviously not applicable here - (a) in an effort to demonstrate criminal intent in
connection with an attempted action which, through fortuity, miscarried or never reached culmination, or (b) in an effort to seek
extenuation of an action which produced bad, unfortunate, or improper results. We may well choose in some cases, to exonerate a
man whose actions have produced an undesirable effect on the ground
that he did not intend such an effect. In the absence of negligence,
or worse, a good heart and a clear conscience will usually be held
to excuse a negative outcome. But we will have arrived at the extremes of overexacting scrutiny and rigorism when we begin invalidating actions with beneficial or wholly innocent outcomes on the
ground that we don't approve of the motivation of one or more of
a collectivity of actors. As Don Marquis once wrote, an idea is not
responsible for the people who believe in it. Similarly, a law (or
other state action) with an acceptable outcome is not responsible
for, and should not be rejected because of, the fact that some people
supported it for unsavory or foolish reasons.
The "entanglements" prong of Lemon is also a source of difficulty. It is so open-ended that it has virtually no prescriptive content. A judge can give his subjective impulses free rein under the

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90

guise of applying this third prong. Even if the challenged law is
impeccably neutral in purpose and effect, he can, if he has any
inclination to strike it down, rule that the nexus between church
and state is just a wee bit too close and therefore gives rise to
excessive entanglements. Indeed, the whole notion of entanglements
seems to be derived from an identifiable extra-constitutional source,
the Jeffersonian "wall of separation" metaphor, and to have a basis
in neither logic nor the Constitution. Its unworkability is best demonstrated by the cases in which it has served as an insurmountable
"catch 22": the ensurance of neutrality under the second prong of
Lemon requires monitoring (or other mechanisms) which would constitute excessive entanglements under the third prong; but the absence of the objectionable entanglements would leave no adequate
means of guaranteeing neutrality. 67 The interpretation of any provision of the Constitution as a "catch 22" is inherently suspect.
According to Rehnquist, we should not be surprised by the failure of the Lemon test to make the basic doctrinal premise set forth
in Everson workable. The problem, he says, is that this premise
"has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret." 68 Without such a basis, no theory can be expected to guide
our interpretation of the establishment clause in consistent and defensible ways. All we can expect, in Rehnquist's words, is "consistent unpredictability" in constitutional adjudication. 69 In
Rehnquist's view, the abandonment of not only the Lemon test, but
also the strict-separationist constitutional jurisprudence in which it
is rooted, is long overdue.
Recently, Justice Scalia implicitly indicated his agreement with
Rehnquist's "pessimistic evaluation" of establishment clause doctrine. 70 Scalia singles out for special (and especially devastating) criticism the "secular purpose requirement" of the Lemon test. He
argues that scrutinizing legislation or other state action to ensure
against a religious intent is so cumbersome and uncertain that it

E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112.
6 Id.
70 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2591, 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10

24

Porth and George: Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishm
TRIMMING THE IVY

19871

should be done by the courts only if demanded by the text of the
establishment clause. But such a reading of the clause, he claims,
is an "unnatural" one. 71 Scalia persuasively advocates the abandonment of the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test as a "good
place to start" the task of rectifying the Supreme Court's "embarrassing establishment clause jurisprudence.''72
In a brief dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice White has indicated that he, too, is dissatisfied with the prevailing establishment
clause jurisprudence. He states that, in view of the history of the
religion clauses (as set out at length in Rehnquist's dissent in that
case), "it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess
our cases dealing with the establishment clause"; he then proceeds
' '73
to endorse explicitly "a basic reconsideration of our precedents.
In her concurrence in Jaffree, Justice O'Connor demurred that
' 74
she "was not ready to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test.
Recalling her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly7 5 O'Connor pro' 77
posed what she deems both a "clarification ' 76 and a "refinement
of that test.
According to O'Connor, the establishment and free exercise
clauses have a common point or purpose, "to secure religious liberty."78 The particular role of the establishment clause, in her view,
is to forbid "government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."' 79 Apparently she understands this prohibition to be rooted in
a concern for religious liberty. She identifies "two principal ways"
in which legislation or other government action can go wrong in
respect of it:
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with
the independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to government

Id. at 2607.
I,
7'Id.
71 Wallace,

472 U.S. at 91.
Id. at 68 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
71 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Conner, J., concurring).
76 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68.
- Id. at 69.

Id. at 68.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
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or governmental powers not fully shared by non-adherents of the religion, and

foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines ...
The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."0

What O'Connor supposes one gets from all this is a coherent picture
of how the three parts of the Lemon test "relate to the principles
enshrined in the establishment clause.""' But, we must ask, what
are these principles? Are they "no-aid" principles, "no-sect-preference" principles, or something else again? And how are these principles promoted by three criteria which, in application, yield such
unprincipled results?
The current group of justices who, to a greater or lesser extent,
dissent from prevailing establishment clause doctrine appear to share
with those justices who wrought that doctrine in Everson a basic
methodological assumption - that "the principles enshrined in the
establishment clause" can be identified by an extra-constitutional
ascertainment of the substantive views of the framers and ratifiers
about the proper relationship between church and state. Ironically,
contemporary defenders of the prevailing doctrine tend to soft-pedal
the Everson Court's methodological reliance upon this sort of inquiry. They express incredulity about the prospect of recovering the
concrete beliefs of the framers and ratifiers, and, in any event, they
argue that those beliefs should not control the application of constitutional provisions to contemporary problems. They attempt to
justify the strict separationism established in Everson not by appeal
to history, but, rather, by appeal to philosophy.82 Thus, they argue
that "no-aid" is sound constitutional doctrine insofar as it constitutes sound moral and political philosophy - even if it turns out
that the Everson justices were dead wrong as a matter of historiography in depicting the framers and ratifiers as strict separationists.
So the contemporary situation is by and large, one in which those
who support the methodology of Everson oppose its conclusions,
90Id. at
SI

Id.

687-88.

at 689.

"E.g., M. PERuY, supra note 42, at 36.
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while those who support its conclusions oppose its methodology. In
our view, however, Everson is incorrect in terms of both its methodology and its conclusions. We hold that interpreters of the establishment clause need not resolve disputed questions of philosophy
or history in order to ascertain the meaning of the words, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
No inquiry need be made into either the philosophical question of
the ideal relationship of church and state or the historical question
of the dominant opinions among the framers and ratifiers regarding
the ideal relationship of church and state. Inquiry of either sort is
irrelevant in view of the fact that the words speak for themselves.
The proper interpretive methodology is, therefore, neither historiographical nor philosophical, but rather textual - a matter of giving
effect to plain meaning.
At this juncture, readers may find their credulity badly strained.
If the meaning of the establishment clause is plain, why has every
Supreme Court justice since 1947 - whether liberal or conservative,
strict separationist or non-preferentialist - felt it necessary to look
beyond the words themselves? Why, indeed, did disputes about the
meaning of the words arise in'the first place? Surely some ambiguity
exists. And to resolve interpretive questions in the face of ambiguity
one must look to something beyond the words.
Now, it is true that most modern interpreters have considered
the establishment clause to contain a certain ambiguity. The source
of this supposed ambiguity is the locution "respecting an." These
words allegedly broaden the meaning of the words "establishment
of religion" to include various aids or preferences which admittedly
fall far short of establishing a religion.83 Were these words not present, most interpreters would presumably find the meaning of the
establishment clause to be clear: it would simply prevent the creation
and maintenance of a state religion along the lines of the national

83 "A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that
end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. This is certainly an odd "sense" to give to the word "re-

specting," which, in its plain meaning, is synonymous with "concerning" and "about," not "approaching" or "tending toward."
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churches of Britain and 'other European nations. But, most maintain,
the establishment clause must forbid more than this or there would
be no need for the words "respecting an." Just what else it forbids
is, of course, a disputed matter. Strict separationists claim that it
forbids any aid to religion; non-preferentialists maintain that it forbids sect-preferences .4
But it is simply a mistake to think that "respecting an" broadens
the meaning of "establishment of religion," and thereby creates ambiguity. These words do forbid the federal government from doing
something beyond establishing a religion, but they do so without
broadening the concept of "establishment." Rather, the inclusion
of the words "respecting an" clearly and concisely forbids the federal government, not only from establishing an official national
church, but also from attempting to disestablish, or otherwise interfere with, official churches in the states.
No one denies that several state establishments existed at the time
of the framing and ratification of the first amendment. 85 Indeed,
the consent of some states with established churches to the ratification of the Bill of Rights was necessary to make it legally operative. 86 One must understand this historical context to appreciate
the prohibition which the establishment clause placed upon the federal government.
The obvious meaning of "respecting an" establishment of religion, then as now, is "regarding," or "having to do with," or
"in reference to" such an establishment. And these words are broad
enough to cover both a possible national establishment and actual
(and potential) state establishments. They call particular attention
to the constitutional disentitlement of the federal government to make

"

Leonard Levy takes the extreme position of emphasizing the word "respecting" (though giving
it its plain meaning of "concerning") while reading out the word "establishment" altogether as superfluous verbiage. L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9697 (1986). Thus, he arrives at the conclusion that the federal and state governments cannot have

anything to do with religion, indeed cannot even make reference to it in their laws. The violence that
this "interpretation" does to the text of the Constitution is obvious. It creates, not a Jeffersonian
wall, but a Berlin Wall of separation between church and state.
85 See G. BRADLEY, supra note 51, at 20, for a review of various historical assessments of these
establishments.
86 Id.
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any law setting up an established church at the federal level or interfering with established churches (and the right of the people to
87
opt to establish churches) at the state level.
This meaning is clear, simple, and offers a satisfying account of
each word of the establishment clause in the historical context in
which it was formulated. Moreover, detailed historical research of
a kind which delves far deeper than the modest historical verities
relied upon under the "plain meaning" method reaches precisely the
88
same conclusion.
One test of this "plain meaning" is to engage in the imaginative
exercise of constructing clear and simple verbal formulations to convey competing meanings and see how close they come to the constitutional formulation. For example, if one wished to prohibit
government from having anything to do with religion, as Leonard
Levy contends the establishment clause does,8 9 one would prohibit
the making of laws "respecting religion." If one wanted to do nothing more than prohibit the federal government from creating a national church, one would enjoin it from making laws "establishing"
any religion (or church). If one wanted to enforce a "no-aid" principle, one would forbid the government from making any laws
"aiding" or "advancing" or "promoting" a church or a religion
(or religion in general). Finally, if one wanted to mandate the "nosect- preference" principle, one would prohibit the government from
treating different churches or religions unequally or from preferring
or discriminating against any church or religion. These (or some
thing quite like them) are the obvious, clear verbal formulations that
would occur to a writer (individually or as part of a collectivity)
who wanted to convey in an unambiguous fashion any of the principal competing meanings that interpreters have ascribed to the es-

8, Although we arrived at this interpretation by an application of the "plain meaning" textual
method, we are certainly not the first to reach this conclusion. Moreover, for those who subscribe
to the full-blown historiographical method, or who are willing (as we are) to use historical research
to verify a purely textual conclusion, recent historiography of vastly greater depth and detail than
the casual efforts of the Everson justices supports this interpretation. E.g., G. BRADLEY, supra note
51, at 95; G. MILLER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AmERICA 75 (1976).

Id.
I5
,L.

LEVY, supra note 84.
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tablishment clause. Whether one starts with the words of the clause,
to try to determine its meaning, or with the possible meanings, to
see how they would likely be expressed, one is left with the inescapable conclusion that there is no correlation between the establishment clause and any meaning except the "plain meaning" that
we have proposed.
We are not impressed by the argument that the fact that some
(or even many) people do not find the meaning of the words of the
establishment clause "plain" requires the conclusion that their
meaning is not plain. To say that meaning is plain is not to suggest
that anyone, much less everyone, grasps it. There can be unwarranted doubt about a perfectly evident meaning, just as there can
be unwarranted certainty about a seriously ambiguous meaning. To
assert that the meaning of a proposition is plain is not necessarily
to imply anything about the actual intellectual achievements or mental states of individual human subjects; it is necessarily to make a
strong statement about the immediate intelligibility of the proposition in question considered as an object of the inquiring human
intellect. All sorts of distortions can prevent one from understanding
evident (or even self-evident) truths. A failure to attend to an historical context which includes the significant fact of established
churches in many of the ratifying states (which is nothing like an
inquiry into the beliefs, or other mental states, of individual framers
and ratifiers) can render the meaning of the words "respecting an"
opaque. Still more insidious are the distortions introduced by zeal
for an ideology or cause, whether "no-aid," "no-sect- preference,"
or anything else. And, of course, doctrine itself, when wrong from
the start, can obscure even the most obvious meaning in far less
time than it takes ivy to enshroud a building.
While our interpretation is unlikely to shock historians, it is quite
likely to scandalize strict separationists and non-preferentialists alike.
The upshot of our argument is that nothing in the first or fourteenth
amendments prohibits the states from establishing religions. The Everson court unanimously concluded that the Constitution had been
amended to incorporate the establishment clause against the states.
We maintain that, in logic, such a principle is incapable of incorporation. Unlike the speech, press, assembly, petition, and free ex-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10

30

Porth and George: Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishm
1987]

TRIMMING THE IVY

ercise clauses of the first amendment, the establishment clause not
only restricts the power of the federal government, it specifically
protects a popular prerogative in the states. It is logically impossible
to turn such a protection on its head and make it a prohibition. As
Bradley points out, "it would be like trying to apply the Tenth
Amendment to the states." 90 One need not reject the incorporation
doctrine in principle (and we do not reject it) to see that it cannot
apply to the establishment clause once the plain meaning of that
provision has been grasped. 91
But to conclude that the establishment clause does not forbid
religious establishments in the states leaves open the question of what
it forbids the federal government from doing in the field of religion
(apart from interfering with state establishments). Everyone would
agree that it may not, as Black put it, "set up a church." 92 But
some would argue that it may not do certain other things which fall
short of constituting full-blown establishments. Here again the debate between strict separationists and non-preferentialists could break
out. Again, however, we would consider the debate misplaced. The
authoritative choice, with respect to the federal government's powers, embodied in the establishment clause is a choice to forbid an
establishment of religion (i.e., a state church). It is not a choice to
prevent federal aid to religions or even to require that such aid be
even-handed. Of course, the federal government could run afoul of
this prohibition without "formally" or "literally" establishing a religion. An establishment in all but name is nonetheless an establishment. The federal government could violate the establishment
clause by affording a particular sect or view about religion such aid
and/or recognition in preference to others that it becomes, in effect,
the national religion. Such a possibility could be ruled out in principle only by adopting formalistic or literalistic approaches which

9OG. BRADLEY, supra note 51, at 95.
11This point - which is the real incorporation problem involved in state establishment clause
cases - was overlooked both by Judge Hand, who rejected incorporation in Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs, and by M. K. Curtis, who criticised him soundly for doing so. Curtis, Judge Hand's
History: An Analysis of History and Method in Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 109 (1983).
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
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are properly rejected by contemporary legal scholars. The plain
meaning methodology need not rely upon, and should certainly not
be confused with, formalism or literalism.
Since we reject the methodology proposed by non-preferentialists, we do not credit their claim that the establishment clause forbids
the federal government from preferring any sect(s) over any others.
They are quite likely correct in claiming that a great many framers
and ratifiers were committed intellectually and/or politically to some
form of non-preferentialism. But insofar as the plain meaning of
the establishment clause does not embody an authoritative choice
to require the federal government to adhere to non-preferentialism,
we see no warrant for reading that position into the first amendment.
Had they wished to do so, the framers and ratifiers could have opted
for a provision embodying non-preferentialist principles. The plain
fact is that they did not do so. Why they did not is a very interesting
historical question - one worthy of the careful labors of historians
who devote themselves to such difficult (and perhaps insoluble) questions. But it is a question which is, from the point of view of the
constitutional interpreter, simply not relevant. As authoritative
choosers, the framers and ratifiers made whatever choices they made.
Many generations later, we are bound by their choices, although
only to the extent that we choose not to replace them with new
authoritative choices. The American people are certainly authorized
under the Constitution to revoke by constitutional amendment the
choices of the framers and ratifiers. No interpreter, however, is authorized to substitute what he regards as a better choice for one of
their evident choices, by adopting an alternative interpretive methodology which disregards, contradicts, or nullifies the plain meaning
of the provisions they framed and ratified. To paraphrase Herbert
W. Vaughan, if this is strict constructionism, we bless it.
SmTH v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COIMASSIONERS
A.

The District Court Decision

The next step which we will undertake in explanation and justification of our reading of the establishment clause is to apply it
to the facts of a real case. The particular case we have chosen is
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Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs.93 We selected Smith for several
reasons - the notoriety of the trial court opinion, the full factual
record accessible through that opinion, and the timeliness and political sensitivity of the issues involved in the case.
On March 4, 1987, Brevard Hand, Chief Judge for the Southern
District of Alabama, granted an injunction sought by a group of
Christian parents and teachers prohibiting the further use in Mobile
County public schools of a large number of textbooks alleged to
contain secular humanist teachings. In a lengthy opinion, Hand held
that the challenged books represented an establishment of religion
in violation of the first amendment as incorporated and applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. The defendant-intervenors appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and, on August 26, 1987,
94
secured a unanimous reversal.
The matter began on May 28, 1982, when Ishmael Jaffree, an
atheist, acting on behalf of himself and his three school-aged children, brought an action against the Mobile County Board of School
Commissioners seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction
prohibiting regular religious observances in the public schools. A
little more than a month later, Jaffree amended his complaint to
add as defendants Governor George Wallace and other state officials, including the Attorney General, the individual members of the
State Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Schools, and
to request an injunction against the implementation of state legislation mandating moments of silence for prayer or meditation in
the schools. Jaffree's claim was that the activities he sought to have
enjoined constituted an establishment of religion in violation of the
United States Constitution.
On July 30, 1982, Douglas T. Smith, a Christian and a public
school teacher, together with other Christian teachers and parents,
filed a motion to intervene as defendants in the case, claiming that
a decision granting the injunctions sought by Jaffree would violate
their federal constitutional rights to the "free exercise" of their re-

11Smith

v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987).

9' Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
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ligion, as well as certain statutory and state constitutional rights.
After this intervention was permitted, the defendant-intervenors filed
a pleading requesting that, if the court decided to grant Jaffree's
injunctions, they be "expanded to include the religions of secularism, humanism, evolution, materialism, agnosticism, atheism, and
others. ' 95 Their claim was that religious activity on behalf of these
"religions" was taking place in the public schools and being fostered
by the State Board of Education.
Jaffree objected to the intervention, maintaining that the plaintiffs were capable of representing a class which would include the
intervenors. In view of the obvious differences of viewpoint between
Jaffree and the intervenors,. however, the court rejected this argument and no class was established.
In November of 1982, the matter was heard, and on January 4,
1983, the court delivered its opinion. 96 Therein, Hand ruled that the
court had no jurisdiction to hear Jaffree's complaint because the
first amendment applied only to the federal government and not to
the states. According to Hand, "the constitution had not been
amended to incorporate the first amendment to the states. ' ' 97
Anticipating reversal for his egregious disregard of Supreme Court
precedent, Judge Hand noted in his opinion that the Court reserved
the right to re-examine the record and consider the claims of the
defendants and defendant-intervenors in the event that his ruling on
the incorporation of the first amendment was overturned on appeal. 98 Predictably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, citing unambiguous Supreme Court authority on the
subject, rejected Hand's position on incorporation and remanded
the case to the district court. 99 The remand order included a direction
to issue and enforce an order enjoining inter alia the implementation
of the statutes challenged by Jaffree on the ground that they were
unconstitutional in light of the establishment clause of the first
91 Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp at 942.
" Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
17 Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp at 943.
11Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1129.
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (lth Cir. 1983).
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amendment. The Eleventh Circuit's ruling was upheld on appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States in a widely-publicized fiveto-four decision. 100
Having reserved jurisdiction, Hand, on remand, reconsolidated
the cases and realigned Smith and the other defendant-intervenors
as parties plaintiff in light of their requests for relief. Jaffree, having
prevailed on his requested relief, withdrew from the case. The former
defendant-intervenors, now plaintiffs, filed a new brief, and the state
defendants moved for a scheduling conference. At that point, a new
set of parties, consisting of several parents and teachers who objected to the plaintiffs' claims that secular humanism was being unconstitutionally advanced in the public schools, intervened as
defendants. Subsequently, certain of the state defendants (i.e., the
Governor of Alabama and the Mobile County School Commissioners), filed consent judgments confessirng the plaintiffs' claims.
The initial move of the new defendant-intervenors was procedural: they filed a pre-trial instrument challenging the jurisdiction
of the Court to realign the parties and resolve the reserved issues.
Their argument was that the remand order in Jaffree v. Wallace
effectively ended the litigation inasmuch as it contemplated no further proceedings beyond the issuance of the injunction ordered
therein. Observing that the granting of such a claim would merely
result in a refiling by the plaintiffs, Hand refused. "Our procedures
are not this wooden. This Court has jurisdiction.'' 1
In view of their large number (more than 600) and the suitability
of their claims for class action adjudication, Hand ordered that the
plaintiffs proceed as a class. Thus, the stage was set for a decision
on the allegedly unconstitutional textbooks.
The plaintiffs proposed to demonstrate that the content of a large
number of home economics, history, and social studies textbooks
being used in Mobile County public schools both constituted an
establishment of the religion of secular humanism and violated the
free exercise rights of parents who wished to rear their children in
Wallace v.
100

Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
"I Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp at 944.
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religious faiths other than humanistic ones. The plaintiffs claimed
that humanism was a "religion" within the meaning of the establishment clause, and should therefore be excluded from the public
schools to the extent that Christianity or any other religion must be
excluded. They also claimed that, in promoting humanism, the textbooks inhibited Christianity, Judaism, and other religions. This sort
of inhibition happens, they argued, when textbooks contain statements contrary to the tenets of other religions; it also happens when
the books omit discussion of the roles played by the religions of
Christianity and Judaism in the history of the United States.
The plaintiffs contended that they did not seek to have the tenets
of Christianity taught in place of those of secular humanism. Rather,
they merely sought equal treatment for Christianity and other religions. They further maintained that a distinction should be drawn
between the teaching of facts about a faith and the teaching of the
tenets of that faith. The former teaching, they argued, is perfectly
appropriate in public institutions devoted to education; the latter,
however, is unconstitutional.
The state defendants, apart from the Governor and the Mobile
County School Commissioners, answered by asserting the following:
(1) in approving textbooks for use in the public schools, the state
had not adopted an approach antagonistic to religion; (2) nothing
compels the plaintiffs or their children to believe the material contained in the textbooks; (3) it would be impossible to construct a
reasonable and substantial curriculum while trying to accommodate
every religious interest by excluding ideas that may be contrary to
someone else's religious beliefs; and (4) secular humanism either is
not a religion or, if it is a religion, is a religion established by the
Constitution itself. At the same time, these defendants admitted that
the curriculum of the schools was defective in its lack of reference
to the contributions of religion to American life and the importance
of religion in American history. But, while agreeing that the state
superintendent should take steps to remedy this situation, they denied that it created a basis for granting the plaintiffs relief of any
kind. In their view, it neither established a religion nor impeded
anyone's free exercise thereof.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
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The defendant-intervenors joined the state defendants in denying
that secular humanism is a religion. They took the position that
"secular humanism" is simply a label for views that do not comport
with religious world views. While admitting that the challenged textbooks do contain certain statements consistent with the beliefs of
some secular humanists, they argued that the books also contain
certain statements consistent with the beliefs of some Christians. In
any event, they maintained, exposure to the books inhibited no one's
free exercise of religion. They also joined the state defendants in
claiming that poor curriculum content, such as the exclusion of
meaningful reference to the role of religion in the historical development of the United States, while regrettable, is not unconstitutional.
In their consent decree stipulations, the Governor and the Mobile
County School Commissioners agreed that secular humanism is a
religion both for free exercise and establishment clause purposes,
and that the promotion of secular humanism in public school textbooks constitutes an unconstitutional inhibition of religion insofar
as it reflects apparent governmental disapproval of theistic religions.
Testimony in the case was taken from numerous parties as well
as from expert witnesses on both sides of the dispute. This testimony
is summarized at length in Judge Hand's opinion.
Various plaintiffs, attacking the textbooks, testified that their
children were being taught a secularist ideology which conflicts in
important ways with their own Christian morality. Many were careful to say that they did not propose to have Christianity taught in
the schools, but sought only to ensure the equal treatment of Christianity and other belief systems. Smith and other teachers testified
that they were forbidden to provide their students with views in
conflict with those espoused by humanism on subjects such as evolution and moral subjectivism, and that, as a result, students were
not being allowed to consider alternatives to the humanist point of
view. 10 2

- Id. at 944-46.
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Several state defendants testified, including Wayne Teague, the
State Superintendent of Schools, John Gyson, the Vice-President of
the State School Board, and William Huestes, apparently a member
of the Board. Most of this testimony concerned the relationship
between the state bureaucracy and local school authorities. Huestes
described the procedures under which local school boards may select
textbooks from a state-approved list. He also described the procedures under which this list is drawn up and the opportunities for
review and comment by members of the public. In reply to a question about whether the authorized textbooks had been examined to
determine whether they contain secular humanist content, Tyson
stated that this had not been undertaken because he does not know
what "secular humanism" means. 103
Two defendant-intervenors testified in support of the books, Patricia Chandler Jones, a public school home economics teacher, and
Corrine Jane Howell, a public school teacher and a parent of public
school children. Both denied that the challenged books espoused
secular humanism or unconstitutionally inhibited Christian belief.
Thus, they attempted to parry both the "establishment" and "free
exercise" claims of the plaintiffs. Mrs. Howell testified that, while
she was a Christian and had reared her children in the Christian
faith, she nevertheless opposed the teaching of the tenets of Christianity in the public schools. This, she apparently feared, was the
veiled purpose of the plaintiffs' action. 1°4 Miss Jones, also a Christian, expressed concern that the attack on the textbooks was really
an assault on "critical thinking."' 15
The expert testimony was rich and colorful. Among those testifying were such nationally known figures as Robert Coles, Russell
Kirk, Paul Kurtz, Richard Baer, William Coulson, James Hitchcock,
and Glennelle Halpin. The plaintiffs sought to demonstrate the
"religious" nature of secular humanism by exhibiting the ways in
which secular humanism criticizes the tenets of various religions (e.g.,
God as the ultimate source of values) and advances alternative tenets
103Id. at 950-51.
"1 Id. at 949.
101Id. at 949-50.
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of its own (e.g., man as the only source of values). The defendants
and defendant-intervenors sought to show that secular humanism is
not a "religion," at least for establishment clause purposes, inasmuch as it relies exclusively on reason (and is thus "scientific") and
makes no appeal to any spiritual or transcendent authority.
A key element of the plaintiffs' strategy was to establish the
profound influence of the avowed humanist John Dewey on the
mainstream of contemporary education in America. As the conservative thinker Russell Kirk observed in his testimony, Dewey repeatedly declared that humanism was a religion and was destined
to supplant the outmoded, childish faiths which had prevailed among
human beings before its ascendancy. Dewey also plainly saw the
public schools as institutions capable of inculcating humanist thought
in rising generations of American youngsters. According to Kirk's
testimony, as summarized in the Hand opinion, "John Dewey's
school of thought may now be adjudged as dominant in educational
06
circles."1
The secular humanist philosopher Paul Kurtz attempted to counter
the plaintiffs' strategy by arguing that Dewey's most influential followers (e.g., Sidney Hook, Ernst Nagel, and Corliss Lamont) as
well as many leading humanists among his contemporaries (e.g.,
Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre) did not believe humanism
to be "religious."' ' 0 7 Therefore, he argued, Dewey's views ought not
be taken as indicative of humanist thinking. Kurtz went on to deny
that secular humanism is a creed or faith. Rather, he argued, it is
a scientific viewpoint that investigates any matter of human concern
without religious preconceptions. It is ethical, but includes no spiritual, transcendent, or other-worldly dimensions. Unlike religions,
it has no piety, cultic practices, or liturgies. 08
Under cross-examination, Kurtz admitted that some contemporary humanists do share Dewey's views that humanism is a religion
and should be spread through the vehicle of the public schools. 0 9

106

Id. at 956.

" Id. at 965.

WI'Id. at 969.
109Id.
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He denied, however, that this was a majority view or a view he
himself shared. At the same time, he was forced to admit that the
American Humanist Association, of which he is a member, has sought
and achieved constitutional immunities and protections as a "religion" under the free exercise clause. He admitted further that the
Association certifies counselors who enjoy the same legal status as
priests, pastors, and rabbis. 10 Perhaps most damagingly, he was
confronted with pieces of his own writing over many years which
appeared to contradict his testimony that humanism is not a religion.
In response, he declared that certain passages contained in these
writings were being taken out of context,' and that, in any event,
2
his views had changed in various ways over time."
There was general agreement among experts on both sides that
the educational quality of the challenged textbooks was, in most
cases, quite poor. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the deposition of
Harvard psychiatrist and social critic Robert Coles, testifying for
the defendant-intervenors, was sympathetic toward the plaintiff parents and their struggles because he shared their view that the books
contained a quantity of "social and cultural rot.""' 3
Judge Hand's opinion summarizes much of the expert testimony
under the headings "Quality of Education," "Secular Humanism,"
"Religion Defined," "Does Secular Humanism Fit the Description
of Religion?," and "The Textbooks.""114 Under the last heading,
testimony quoting specific textbook passages alleged to contain humanist religious (or irreligious) content is summarized. In addition,
Appendix N of the opinion provides extensive direct quotation of
such passages under the headings "Examples of Anti-Theistic Teaching" (Attachment A), "Subjective and Personal Values Without an
External Standard of Right or Wrong" (Attachment B), "Hedonistic, Pleasure, Need-Satisfaction Motivation" (Attachment C), and
"Anti-Parental, Anti-Family Values" (Attachment D).1 15
11oId.

at 970.

"I Id. at 965.
,,2
Id. at 970.
M'Id. at 960.
1"4

Id. at 959-74.

"I Id. at 999-1013.
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While it is debatable whether certain passages are appropriately
catalogued under these headings, the quoted material reveals that,
at least so far as the textbooks were concerned, the Mobile County
Schools were certainly not providing "morally neutral" or "valuefree" education. Clearly, the texts proposed that certain views about
the nature of moral life were more reasonable, up-to-date, and suitable than others. Just as clearly, the texts sought to promote the
formation of individuals with a particular, and controversial, selfunderstanding. The view and self-understanding preferred in the
books may legitimately be said to be in harmony with the tenets of
secularist and humanist philosophies and in conflict with the teachings of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
Attempts by defendants' witnesses to deny this all involved the
claim that the texts do not favor any particular moral or religious
views, but merely attempt to assist the student in choosing for himself the views he will adopt. Implicit in this, however, is a position
about the nature of moral life which is itself highly controversial
as a matter of moral philosophy and theology. From a secularist or
humanist viewpoint, propositions such as "[s]tandards are a personal
decision and will vary with each person" or "[m] orals are rules made
by people" - to quote from Today's Teen, one of the challenged
116
textbooks - provide the foundation for truly "critical thinking."
But from alternative religious and philosophical viewpoints, they
merely represent the secular humanist ideology of subjectivism.
Hand concluded as a matter of law that the viewpoint adopted
by the books qualifies as "religion" under the establishment clause.
In the course of reviewing Supreme Court precedents on the definition of "religion" for constitutional purposes, he argued that the
"religious" nature of belief systems is indicated ultimately by the
questions they address. He cited four areas in which "religious"
belief systems address questions and make assumptions: (1) the-existence of supernatural and/or transcendent reality; (2) the nature
of man; (3) the ultimate end, goal, or purpose of man's individual
and collective existence; and (4) the purpose and nature of the uni116Id.

at 1003.
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verse. 1 7 The viewpoint adopted by the textbooks, whether labeled
"secular humanist" or not, at least implicitly addresses issues and
makes assumptions in all of these areas. He therefore found the
viewpoint to be "religious" and, insofar as it corresponded to the
secular humanist viewpoint, to represent the "religion" of secular
humanism.
While remarking that he retained his view that the first amendment does not apply to the states, Hand acknowledged that his court
was bound by the contrary judgments of higher courts. The question
then became one of whether the state could, without violating the
establishment clause, favor the religious viewpoint of secular humanism over alternatives in its schools. He ruled that it could not.
Accordingly, he enjoined further use of the offending textbooks in
the public schools of Alabama.
The notoriety of Hand's decision must be understood in light
of contemporary politics as well as constitutional jurisprudence. Over
many years, organizations promoting a liberal social agenda have
successfully employed strategies involving constitutional litigation in
the federal courts to eradicate what they perceived to be an officially
sanctioned Christian, or theistic, or religious bias in the public schools
especially in certain southern states. The thrust of establishment
clause jurisprudence as it emerged from this litigation has been in
the direction of a strict separationist view of religion and public
education. While the language of "neutrality" has frequently been
employed in establishment clause cases, it is clear from these cases
that the state must be "neutral" not only among religious sects, but
also between religion and competing non-religious viewpoints. From
the liberal point of view, the ensuing secularization of, inter a/ia,
public education was a welcome development. It was considered not
only fair, but enlightened and progressive.
.It is hardly surprising, then, that the Hand decision strikes many
liberals as a perverse maneuver by a reactionary southern judge seeking to impose (some might say reimpose) Christianity in the public
schools. "Secular humanism," they are inclined to believe, is a mere

"I Id. at 979.
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right-wing bogey. They view it as simply a convenient catch phrase
meant to color as "religious" (and therefore subject to antiestablishmentarian constitutional principles) an educational philosophy
aimed at teaching students to think for themselves (or "think critically"). They perceive it as being used, still more sinisterly, by fundamentalist zealots as an excuse to attempt to unravel the tradition
of modern constitutional jurisprudence that now stands in the way
of their supposed goal of re-Christianizing American public education.
Our principal concern, however, is not the political palatability
of the result reached by Judge Hand, but the constitutionality of
his opinion, i.e., its consistency (or inconsistency) with the establishment clause. Obviously, it is inconsistent with what we maintain
to be the plain meaning of the clause. At the most fundamental
level, the case involved no justiciable controversy under the establishment clause since the clause is not applicable to the states." 8 Even
if one accepts the incorporation of the clause, however, occasional
statements in a public school textbook favoring religion in general,
or one religion over others, clearly do not amount to an actual
establishment of religion. Once incorporation is deemed to have occurred, one of the two parallel purposes of the establishment clause
(i.e., no federal interference with a state establishment) disappears.
This merely limits the scope of the phrase "respecting an establishment of religion." It does not confer upon the words a radically
different meaning. Thus, after incorporation, both the federal and
state governments are prohibited from one thing and one thing only
establishing a religion. And the plain meaning of an establishment
of religion is government adoption of one religion as the official
state religion - or a pattern of preference for one religion so comprehensive and thoroughgoing that it constitutes an establishment
in everything but name.
Of course, the plain meaning of the establishment clause, as we
read it, is not the accepted meaning - and might never be so. We
propose, therefore, to examine Judge Hand's analysis in the light
of conventional establishment clause jurisprudence.
M See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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The stated ground for Judge Hand's decision to enjoin the use
of the challenged textbooks in the Mobile County schools was that
the use of the books violated the establishment clause insofar as
their content promoted the religion of secular humanism. Under the
prevailing doctrine, it is undoubtedly possible for officials responsible for the selection of textbooks in public schools to violate the
establishment clause by their choices. For example, a history text
that taught as a matter of fact that Jesus Christ rose from the dead
three days after his crucifixion and appeared in the flesh to his
disciples would certainly violate the second prong of the Lemon test
in that it would clearly advance the Christian religion. A less dramatic, but nonetheless clear, example would be a text that taught
that moral rules are given by God." 9 Such a text, while perhaps
promoting no particular religion, would promote a view common
to theistic religions over contrary religious and secularist views.120
Is it in principle possible for officials to violate the establishment
clause under the prevailing doctrine by selecting textbooks that promote secular humanism? Those who deny this possibility argue that
secular humanism is not a religion. They claim that it is, rather, a
scientific or philosophical viewpoint. As such, it may be promoted
in school textbooks without running afoul of the establishment clause.
But this reasoning is fallacious.
"I It is arguable that the objectionable content found in words or actions when they are viewed
in isolation can sometimes be diluted or neutralized by their context or setting. This concept has been
applied to religious paintings in a museum and a creche used as part of a municipallty's holiday
decorations. See the discussion in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 69293. We cannot, however, conceive of the concept being applied by a federal court to countenance
the inclusion of even an isolated proposition of religious faith in a textbook.
110There are two distinct ways in which the plaintiffs claimed, and Judge Hand ruled, that the
challenged textbooks violated the establishment clause - by containing statements which promoted

or disparaged particular religions (or religion in general) and by neglecting to give adequate emphasis
to the historical roles played by religion, religious leaders, and "believers" in general. The latter claim
is problematical. We are not prepared to conclude in principle that there could be no neglect of
religious matters in a particular textbook so egregious that it could not give rise to a valid claim
under conventional establishment clause doctrine. However, any such claim would be so dependent
on the precise wording of the challenged textbook in its entirety that it could not be properly assessed
on the basis of extracts and summaries of the sort contained in Judge Hand's opinion, for all its

factual detail. We have not undertaken to read any of the forty social studies and history texts which
Judge Hand found to be unconstitutionally neglectful of religion. Consequently, in analyzing the
opinions of both the trial and appellate courts, we shall confine ourselves to an evaluation of the

treatment accorded the "improper inclusion" claims and pass over entirely the "improper neglect"
claims. All of our comments should be read in the context of this implicit limitation.
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Whether one categorizes secular humanism as a "religion" or
not is irrelevant for purposes of prevailing establishment clause doctrinal analysis. One significant fact is that secular humanism constitutes, and is presented by its proponents as constituting, an
alternative to (other) religion(s). On any reasonable understanding
of the core values protected by the establishment clause, as it is
understood under the prevailing doctrine, it would be irrational to
permit the establishment of such a view in preference to (other)
religious views. These core values (e.g., fairness, personal authenticity, liberty of conscience) would be no less jeopardized by the
governmental promotion of secular humanism (whether considered
as an alternative to religion or as a religion itself) than by the establishment of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, or
Voodoo.
Moreover, at the level of particulars, secular humanism embraces
certain positions on questions which have, or can have, an obvious
and important religious dimension. Such positions frequently contradict the tenets of theistic religions in general, or certain theistic
religions in particular. The neutrality required under the Lemon test
therefore prohibits state promotion of such positions.121 Take, for
example, the following spectrum of statements:
3 All of the teachings of the Catholic Church are true.
2 The teaching of the Catholic Church concerning the Assumption of the Virgin
Mary is true.
1 The Virgin Mary did not die and suffer decay and corruption, but was assumed
bodily into Heaven.
0 The Catholic Church teaches that the Virgin Mary was assumed bodily into
Heaven.
1' The Virgin Mary died and suffered decay and corruption, and was not bodily
assumed into Heaven.
2' The teaching of the Catholic Church concerning the Assumption of the Virgin
Mary is false.
3' All of the teachings of the Catholic Church are false.

Statement 0 is a simple descriptive statement of what the Catholic
Church believes. It is theologically neutral in that it takes no position
121 For statements of the neutrality requirement, see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60, and the pre-Lemon
case, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1963). Ironically, the Eleventh
Circuit cited the requirement and these very cases in the course of reversing Judge Hand. Smith v.
Board of Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 689.
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on the truth or falsity of the Catholic belief. Presumably there could
be no serious objection, even under conventional establishment clause
thinking, to a statement of this kind being included in a public
school textbook dealing with an academic discipline where a descriptive study of a particular religious belief was pertinent. (To
explain the qualifications in the preceding sentence, we should note
that the only serious objections which occur to us are (a) if the
subject area of the textbook is one in which a consideration of
religious beliefs is gratuitous or irrelevant, or (b) if the religious
belief of only the Catholic Church is considered in a context in which
such selectivity is arbitrary. A few obvious instances in which a
descriptive statement of one or more Catholic beliefs could be included in a textbook without incurring objection (a) or (b) would
be a science book which reviewed the life of Galileo, a history book
which treated Martin Luther's role in the Protestant Reformation,
and a philosophy book which analyzed the thinking of Thomas
Aquinas.)
Statements 1, 2, and 3 and 1', 2', and 3' contain various propositions affirming the truth or falsity of the teaching which is merely
described in Statement 0. Each numbered statement and its prime
are symmetrical. Statements 3 and 3' are the most comprehensive;
they affirm the truth and falsity, respectively, of all Catholic teachings and, thus, of any particular teaching, including that described
in Statement 0. Statements 2 and 2' and 1 and 1' are propositions
about the truth or falsity of only the teaching described in Statement
0, but they make reference to that teaching in different ways. Statements 2 and 2' expressly identify the teaching as the teaching of the
Catholic Church but do not contain any precis of it. Statements 1
and 1' contain a precis of the teaching but make no express identification of it as the teaching of the Catholic Church. One final
point which must be emphasized is that Statements 1, 2, and 3 contain propositions that are a part of the official and authoritative
system of beliefs of (at least one) religion. The primes of those
statements contain propositions which could be part of the belief
system of a (competing) religion, but which could also be adopted
by institutions, or included in systems of belief, which are not primarily religious in character.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
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We would contend that, under conventional establishment clause
jurisprudence, none of the seven statements given above, except
Statement 0, could constitutionally be asserted through state action
(e.g., by being included in a public school textbook). Statement 3
or 3' would put the state in the position of endorsing or denying
in its entirety the corpus of beliefs of a particular religion. By making Statement 2 or 2' the state would endorse or deny one specific
belief of a particular religion, expressly identified by the state as a
belief of that religion. Statement 1 or 1' would likewise involve the
state in endorsing or denying one specific belief of a particular religion, although without expressly indentifying the religion whose
adherents hold the belief.
We think that there is nothing controversial about our contention
in the preceding paragraph and, therefore, we will not deter the
progress of the analysis with a detailed discussion of why those
statements would be regarded as unconstitutional. We trust that the
gradations on the spectrum from Statements 3 to 1 and 3' to 1'
adequately demonstrate that nothing turns on the difference between
an endorsement (or denial) of all of the beliefs of a religion and
some subset thereof, or on the difference between mentioning and
not mentioning the particular religion associated with a specific religious belief.
The very lack of controversy about the six objectionable statements given above, however, may convey the impression that our
spectrum is not a useful method of analysis. Those particular statements are not only obviously unconstitutional under the second prong
("primary effect") of the Lemon test, as that prong has been applied; they are also statements which it is difficult to conceive of
ever encountering in a modern American textbook. But other formulations of such statements can be constructed which are both
plausible and objectionable - plausible, in that they sound fairly
neutral and can easily be imagined as figuring in even the most upto-date textbook, but objectionable, in that they are, as a matter
of logic, a clear deviation from the ground of neutrality in which
true Level 0 statements may be found.
Take, for example, the following statement, which can readily
be imagined as occurring in a modern textbook dealing with,
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987
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inter alia, such subjects as biology, chemistry, or ecology:
1" [A] Modern science teaches that, [B] in the natural course of things, all
human beings die and their bodies (unless they are subjected to artificial or

natural preservative processes) readily deteriorate and break down into the
simple chemical building blocks of which all material things are composed.

This would be a Level 0 statement. First of all, with the inclusion
of the italicized phrase [A], it is merely descriptive of what "modern
science" teaches. Second, with the inclusion of the italicized phrase
[B], it is not inconsistent with either a belief that the Assumption
of the Virgin Mary actually occurred or a belief that it did not. If
the Assumption occurred, it was certainly a miracle and perforce a
departure from the natural course of things. Statement 1" merely
sets forth an account of that natural course and expresses no view
on whether departures from that course (i.e., miracles) are possible
or whether any such departures have ever occurred.
We would even be prepared to concede that, in the proper context, Statement 1" could constitutionally be included in a public
school textbook minus both italicized phrases. In a discussion of
science, for example, it is a reasonable implication of any unqualified expression of scientific "fact" that the expression reflects the
generally prevailing view among contemporary men of science. If
the view is an antique, controversial, or minority view, one would
expect an expression of it to be suitably qualified. It is also a reasonable implication of an expression of a "fact" of science that it
is intended to be a commentary upon the natural material order. It
is that order, after all, with which science deals and about which
it is capable of making meaningful observations, experimentation,
and conclusions. So, if the quoted statement were encountered in
a plainly scientific context, and even if it simply began "All human
beings.

.

.,"

one could legitimately infer the unexpressed qualifi-

cations contained in the absent phrases [A] and [B] and regard the
statement as, effectively, a Level 0 statement.
Make a slight change, however, to come up with the following
statement, and the implications and effect are entirely different:
1'

All human beings who ever lived (apart from those living in the world today)
have died and their bodies (unless they were subjected to artificial or natural
preservative processes) have deteriorated and broken down into the simple
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chemical building blocks of which all material things are composed at least, have begun that process of deterioration.

or,

Here you have not a scientific "fact" but a putatively historical
"fact" derived, in all likelihood (if faultily derived, as a matter of
logic), from a generally accepted scientific "fact." Statement 1'
does not entail any particular view on the possibility of a miraculous
departure from the relevant natural process in the future; it is, however, inconsistent with the belief that such a miraculous departure
may have already occurred. Logically, it is a denial not only of the
Assumption of the Virgin Mary, but also of the Resurrection and
Ascension of Jesus Christ.
The conclusion which we draw from our spectrum analysis is
that the second prong of Lemon requires "symmetry of exclusion"
and "symmetry of inclusion" in order to achieve its stated goal of
neither advancing nor inhibiting religion. In other words, if any
statements which deviate in one direction from Level 0 are permitted, statements which deviate to the same degree in the opposite
direction must not only be allowed but must be affirmatively supplied in order to preserve even-handed treatment. And if statements
which deviate in one direction are excluded, statements which deviate
to the same degree in the opposite direction must also be excluded.
Thus, if Statement 1' is included in a textbook, Statement 1 must
also be included; and if Statement 1 is excluded, Statement 1' must
be excluded, as well.
We believe that such exacting and consistent even-handedness is
constitutionally required under the Lemon test. We also believe that,
by and large, it has not generally been accorded. In public school
textbooks, deviation from the ground of neutrality in the direction
of various prime statements (i.e., anti-religious statements) has been
permitted, when adequately disguised. Even the slightest deviation
in the opposite direction has been thoroughly suppressed. Smith v.
Board of School Comm'rs itself provides the perfect illustration:
Judge Hand insisted on an even-handed application of conventional
establishment clause analysis; the Eleventh Circuit reversed him and
endorsed the asymmetrical bias against religious points of view which
is a familiar characterstic of most modern establishment clause decisions.
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Let us focus on one of the objectionable statements in one of
the challenged textbooks in Smith. Today's Teen states that "morals
are rules made by people. 122 This claim, if Judge Hand was correct
in according it the contextual meaning which he did, is obviously
highly controversial. It amounts to an espousal of moral relativism
and moral positivism; it both denies the existence of a permanent
objective moral order and teaches that human beings can determine,
rather than discover, what is morally right and wrong. Most religions
deny these propositions; secular humanism affirms them. Clearly,
the teaching embodied in the statement confers an advantage upon
secular humanist views and a disadvantage upon the religious alternatives. It assists parents who wish to inculcate securalist beliefs
in their children and burdens parents who wish to pass on their
religious faith. If one considers secular humanism as a religion, the
constitutional violation under prevailing establishment clause doctrine is immediately evident. If, however, one considers secular humanism not as a religion itself, but as an alternative to religions,
the constitutional violation is no less apparent. Under our spectrum
analysis, the statement "morals are rules made by people" is as
much a deviation from the ground of neutrality as the statement
"morals are rules made by God." If either statement is constitutionally impermissible, both statements are impermissible.
It is a curious phenomenon that many liberal onlookers, because
they believe (rightly or wrongly) that Judge Hand's motivation in
ruling as he did arose from a sympathy with fundamentalist Christian views, have judged the result of the case instinctively rather
than analytically. It is unthinkable to such liberals that Hand's decision could be correct. But a clear-headed review of the case in
light of the prevailing doctrine reveals that, to the extent that that
doctrine is faithful (or is authoritatively decreed to be faithful) to
the establishment clause, Hand's decision is substantially correct. It
simply follows the recipe provided by the Supreme Court in Everson
and Lemon in applying to the gander the sauce savored by so many
liberals when applied to the goose.

"ISmith

v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. at 1003.
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B.

The Court of Appeals Reversal

To the surprise of virtually no one, Judge Hand's decision was
reversed on appeal. On August 26, 1987, the Eleventh Circuit, on
the basis of its rejection of Hand's findings of fact and application
of law to facts, ruled that none of the challenged textbooks violated
the establishment clause. However, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion,
while coinciding exactly with liberal political sympathies, is far less
faithful to the principles espoused in the conventional establishment
clause jurisprudence than the opinion it overturned.
As we have already pointed out, the question of whether or not
secular humanism is a religion need not be resolved in order to assess
the plaintiffs' claims. The Eleventh Circuit also saw no need to
address this question, but was willing to assume, for the sake of
argument, that secular humanism is a religion.123 Quoting from a
variety of precedents, the court framed the dispositive question to
be whether the state of Alabama "pursue[d] a course of complete
neutrality toward religion," i.e., that it "protect[ed] all,

prefer[red] none, and

. . .

disparage[d] none.

1

24

In analyzing this question, the court, of course, applied the Lemon
test. It passed over with little comment the first ("secular purpose")
and third ("no excessive entanglements") prongs of that test on the
ground that no party had alleged their violation. The court focused
exclusively on the second ("primary effect") prong. The full statement of that prong in Lemon is that the "principal or primary effect
[of a challenged state action] must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." This was not, in fact, the test applied by the
Eleventh Circuit. It first posited its own reformulation of the second
prong of Lemon on the strength of comments by Justice O'Connor
in her concurring opinions in Jaffree and Lynch. The Eleventh Circuit's version (via Justice O'Connor) of the "second prong of
Lemon" is that the challenged state action "conveys [no] message
25
of endorsement or disapproval" of religion.

-

Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d at 689.

'1

Id. See supra note 121.

"I Id. at 690.
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This, obviously, is an entirely different requirement. It scrutinizes
not the primary effect of a state action, but a judge's perception
of the message which that action conveys. Two additional layers of
subjectivity have thereby neatly been inserted into what was intended
to be a straightforward inquiry into consequences. Under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, one looks not at consequences, or even at
some supposed message which either the action or its consequences
have actually conveyed to the public, but instead at a judge's speculative impression of what message could or would be conveyed.
If the court had focused on effect, it would have had to conclude
that at least certain statements in at least some of the textbooks
advanced, as propositions of fact, views contrary to tenets of at
least some theistic religions. 126 Whatever the primary purpose of the
textbooks, taken as a whole, might be, the primary effect of such
statements is the inhibition of religion. (It is also the advancement
of a religion if one regards secular humanism as a religion.) Under
an even-handed application of the conventional establishment clause
jurisprudence, the focus must be upon the consequences of the challenged statements alone, if, as we believe, that would be the focus
in the case of a challenged statement of theistic belief. 27 The factual
assertion that morality is subjective can no more be saved from
violating (the conventional understanding of) the establishment clause
by being inserted in the midst of two hundred pages of sewing tips
and recipes for French toast than can the factual assertion that Jesus
Christ rose from the dead be saved by being inserted in two hundred
pages of uncontroversial facts about world history.
If the court had focused on public perceptions of the effect of
the challenged statements, it would have been forced to recognize
that at least a substantial number of persons perceived the state's
message to be one of disapproval of theistic religious beliefs. This
is apparent from the testimony of teachers and parents on which
Judge Hand relied and which is summarized in detail in his opinion.
It must be granted, of course, that this perception was not shared
by all members of the public. But under the ordinary standard of
'2 E.g., the statements from Today's Teen which we have focused upon.

"I See supra note 119.
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appellate review, there was an ample basis in the record of the case

for a trial judge to conclude that the challenged state action conveyed an unconstitutional message. 12
It was only by divorcing itself completely from the record and
speculating abstractly on the message conveyed, not by the challenged statements themselves but by the challenged textbooks as a
whole, that the court was able to find that they passed muster under

the second prong of the Lemon test. The court gave three statements
of the message it believed was conveyed by the books. One does

nothing more than embrace certain of the values of secular humanism expressed axiomatically in the books and portray those values, not as controversial claims about profound questions of morality

and religion, but as uncontroversial human and civic virtues: "[T]he
message conveyed is one of a governmental attempt to instill in
Alabama public school children such values as independent thought,

tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and
logical decision-making."'

129

This is not even an impartial determi-

nation of what the message is, but a value judgment that the message
is a desirable one.
The court's second statement of the message, like its first, reflects
its own agreement with the disputed ethical propositions found in
the challenged home economics books, and a sorry incapacity for
understanding that these propositions are both disputable and disputed:
The message conveyed by these textbooks with regard to theistic religion is one
of neutrality: the textbooks neither endorse theistic religion as a system of belief,
nor discredit it. Indeed, many of the books specifically acknowledge that religion
is one source of moral values and none preclude that possibility.130

M The Eleventh Circuit did not apply the ordinary standard that a lower court's decision should
not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Instead, it engaged in a de novo review of Judge
Hand's findings of fact and his application of law to facts, citing as its only authority for such a
practice two concurring opinions of Justice O'Connor - neither of which, incidentally, addresses
standards of appellate review. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d at 690 n.4. Although
the Court gratuitously noted that it could have reached the same conclusion under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, it obviously could not have done so had the focus of its inquiry been
the message actually perceived by a substantial segment of the public.
"I Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d at 692.
130Id.
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For some reason, the court supposes that the view that morality is
grounded in subjective choice and that one possible subjective choice
is to seek guidance from religion is not antithetical to the view (of
theistic religions) that morality is objective. Such thinking is unconscionably sloppy and, viewed most charitably, betrays the depth
and unconsciousness of the court's own acceptance of the secular
humanist belief on this point.
The court's third statement of the message conveyed has reference to the message of the challenged history and social studies
textbooks. Although, as we have already indicated, we do not attempt to evaluate either the lower court's or the appellate court's
conclusions with respect to these books, the following supposed
"message" which the Eleventh Circuit found them to convey must
be quoted in demonstration of the emptiness of the method of analysis which that court employed:
We do not believe that an objective observer could conclude from the mere omission of certain historical facts regarding religion or the absence of a more thorough
discussion of its place in modern American society that the State of Alabama
was conveying a message of approval of the religion of secular humanism. Indeed,
the message that reasonably would be conveyed to students and others is that
the education officials, in the exercise of their discretion over school curriculum,
chose to use these particular textbooks because they deemed them more relevant
to the curriculum, or better written, or for some other nonreligious reason found
them to be best suited to their needs."'

This is not, in any sense, a "message" which could conceivably be
conveyed by any textbook. It is simply speculation about the motives
of those who approve textbook use. It fails even to consider the
content of the books themselves. One might as well suppose, regardless of the content of a textbook, that, because public officials
ought not to approve textbooks which promote particular religious
views, the officials who approved a particular book had no such
motive, and -

at the absurd end of this chain of illogic -

that

the textbook does not engage in such promotion.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion, in short, is intellectually shoddy.
It distorts the very test (the second prong of Lemon) which it purhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
" Id. at 693-94.
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ports to apply. Then, in performing the application, it falls miserably
short of the principled neutrality which it earnestly invokes. For
those who find satisfaction in speculating on the philosphical motives
that inspire result-oriented judges (and who, rightly or wrongly, attribute such motives to Judge Hand), the opinion of the Eleventh
Circuit should be a fertile object of study. Whatever criticism may
justly be leveled at Judge Hand, his analysis must at least be conceded to be even-handed.
One charge which we have not seen leveled at Judge Hand is
that he wrote his opinion in Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs in
the role of (what we call) judge as satirist. We mean by that phrase
a lower court judge bound by precedent, or any judge holding a
minority view, who conveys his criticism of a disagreeable rule of
decision by deliberately forcing it to, not a reductio ad absurdum,
but its logical end point. Functionally, the technique employs stark
logical rigor in circumstances in which prudence or mercy might
ordinarily recommend a bit of intellectual sleight of hand. Such a
judge may hope, through the imposition of a disturbing result, to
draw attention to the inadequacies of the rule of decision which he
(in the case of a lower judge bound by precedent) is not empowered
to criticize openly or (in the case of a judge holding a minority view)
is not able to discredit in the eyes of his brethren through persuasion
alone.
There is much to be said in favor of a judge acting as satirist
upon occasion. It serves something of the function of a highly-energized dissent, yet it can be used far more widely - even, for
example, by a district court judge who wishes to correct the errors
of his circuit judges or the justices of the Supreme Court, but who
has no more seemly means of doing so at his disposal. In short, it
increases the field of effect of judicial wisdom at whatever level of
the hierarchy it may be found. But the technique has serious drawbacks as well. Any satire which produces its effect principally through
practical results rather than words claims real human victims. Someone will have his only case decided less justly for the sake of a
hoped-for improvement in the decision of a class of cases in the
future. Although there should be a profound contempt reserved for
the judge who habitually sacrifices the rule of law to his personal
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conception of justice in the individual case, one cannot unreservedly
commend a judge who embraces the opposite extreme.
In any event, it strikes us that there might be some surface plausibility in classifying the trial court's opinion in Smith v. Board of
School Comm'rs as the work of the judge as satirist. Judge Hand
took conventional establishment clause doctrine and applied it against
irreligion precisely as it is customarily applied against religion. The
howls of pain which reverberated throughout the legal, academic,
and media establishments were a reminder of just how offensive
equal treatment can be to the privileged. Ultimately, however, we
reach the conclusion that Judge Hand was not exercising his satirical
gifts. At bottom, the effect of his opinion was not to make a bad
problem worse for the sake of drawing attention to it, but to import
a measure of fundamental fairness into a chaotic and unbalanced
area of law. This may not be the work of a judicial Swift or Aristophanes, but it is the work of someone at least as valuable, a
conscientious and even-handed judge.
CONCLUSION:

A

PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INTERPRETIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS

It would be our inclination, if we were redrafting the Constitution, to forbid religious establishments, not only at the federal
level but also in the states. We would, moreover, impose upon the
federal and state governments a constitutional duty to treat religious
activities, groups, viewpoints, etc. even-handedly. We would be
guided in our draftsmanship by principles of political morality which
specify a due regard for liberty, fairness, tolerance, and, above all,
personal authenticity in matters of religion. These principles are
drawn, not from any positive law (indeed, they are the guides of
human choice and action in the positing of law including the law
of the Constitution), but from the objective order of justice which
is a part of the natural (i.e., moral) law.
Obviously, we have no warrant to redraft the Constitution. In
interpreting the Constitution as it is written, other principles of political morality (i.e., the principles of the rule of law) themselves
forbid us from ignoring the plain meaning of constitutional provisions for the sake of producing more desirable outcomes. Thus, 56
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
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while we would favor a constitutional amendment to prohibit all
governmental establishments of religion and require even-handedness
in governmental treatment of religions, we oppose efforts to effect
such an amendment by what Justice White has aptly called the
"exercise of raw judicial power."' 13 2 To the extent that those responsible for the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution disrespect the distinction between interpretation and amendment, the
people they serve no longer live under the protections of a written
constitution.
Still, we are not so naive as to suppose that the plain meaning
of the establishment clause will be given effect by the Supreme Court.
Established doctrines, even when erroneous, are hard to dislodge.
Moreover, as the 1987 confirmation hearings on Robert Bork have
demonstrated, some outcomes are so highly valued that no demonstration of their lack of fidelity to, or even direct inconsistency
with, the Constitution will shake the commitment of judges and of
political actors involved in the selection and advancement of judges,
to their political insulation and perpetuation.
The outcomes produced by prevailing establishment clause doctrine, however, are sufficiently undesirable to warrant pragmatic
challenges to that doctrine. While outcomes under our plain meaning
approach would likewise be undesirable as a matter of abstract political morality (although required as a matter of sound constitutional interpretation), outcomes superior to both those commanded
by the Constitution and those produced under the conventional misinterpretation of the establishment clause are possible. An endeavor
to produce such superior outcomes would not be good constitutional
interpretation (which plain meaning alone can provide with respect
to the establishment clause), but at least it would produce some
genuine practical benefits. In short, if one cannot bring about fidelity to the Constitution, one should at least embrace a form of
infidelity which yields (judged from the standpoint of political morality) sound, fair, workable, and reasonably consistent results. The
prevailing infidelity certainly cannot claim to do this.

WRoe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 222 (1973).
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What we would propose is a reading of either the establishment
clause or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
so as to require even-handedness in all governmental action toward
religious activities, groups, viewpoints, etc. 13 Such a reading would
implicitly forbid religious establishments inasmuch as a decision to
elevate one sect above others would be, in principle, discriminatory
among religions. It would not, however, demand the sort of strict
separationism which creates the danger of discrimination against religious viewpoints and in favor of non-religious alternatives to religion. Finally, it would help to limit undesirable judicial intervention
into such areas as school curriculum decisions, insofar as it placed
the burden on a complainant to establish that a challenged state
action not only injected a particular view about religion into a text
or lecture at a certain point, but that the school's educational enterprise, judged as a whole, was discriminatory. This burden was
in effect imposed on the fundamentalist plaintiffs in Smith by the
Eleventh Circuit. A fair (if non-constitutional) doctrine of evenhandedness in matters of religion would impose it equally on those
complaining of religious and anti-religious elements in school teaching, curricula, and materials.114
Perhaps the soundest passage in the Eleventh Circuit's undistinguished opinion in Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs was its comments on the "special context" of public elementary and secondary
schools:
This special context is one which requires a sensitivity on the part of the court
to both the broad discretion given school boards in choosing the public school
curriculum, which mandates that courts not intervene in the resolution of conflicts
arising in the daily operation of school systems unless basic constitutional values

3
The principle of even-handedness is embodied in the no-sect-preference reading of the establishment clause, which, despite its inadequacy as the "plain meaning" of the clause, is eminently
sound as a principle of political morality.
13 We stated in our introduction that a principle of even-handedness
was "freely derivable"
from either the establishment or equal protection clauses. We meant by that simply that a modern
judge could derive such a principle from the values protected by those clauses with no greater infidelity
to the constitutional text than is customary in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. Our use of
the word "freely" in this context is as an antonym of "strictly." Such free derivation would be
claimed by many, we presume, to be a valid method of constitutional interpretation; we believe it
to be essentially non-interpretive in character.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/10
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are 'directly and sharply implicate[d],' and the pervasive influence exercised by
the public schools over the children who attend them, which makes scrupulous
compliance with the establishment clause in the public schools particularly vital."'3

Few things would serve our state systems of public education less
well than the transformation of them into battlefields in the wars
of indoctrination into religion and irreligion. Judge Hand's ruling
deserves sharp criticism on this score, although the brunt of the
criticism must be directed at the precedents which he followed. Had
Judge Hand's ruling become prevailing law, it would probably have
ushered in an era of opposing waves of litigation by religious parents
and secular humanist parents over every last sentence in a textbook
and comment in a teacher's lecture. Ultimately we might well have
seen washed away much of the remaining content of public education - which has become a pretty thin gruel in recent years in
response to the conflicting sensitivities of various participants in the
public education process. The only result that could be expected
from such a process would be the apotheosis of whatever is bland
and unobjectionable. The Eleventh Circuit deserves no praise, however, for the analysis which it substituted for Judge Hand's. That
analysis merely perpetuated an unconscionable double standard under which the secular humanist is licensed to pick every last speck
of religion out of the system of public education while no attention
is paid to the essentially anti-religious structure and content of much
of that system. This outcome does not keep the courts from interfering in the educational process; it merely ensures that the interference will be completely one-sided.
Under a standard of even-handedness, public schools could pass
muster either by excluding all controversial material in the realm of
religion/irreligion or by providing a reasonably balanced presentation of opposing viewpoints. We do not suggest that the balance
would have to be a precise one; it would merely have to ensure that
significant viewpoints were not wholly excluded and that no particular position was unduly emphasized as the sole correct viewpoint.
Instead of having a perpetual Garritization of public education, the
decision-making with respect to public schools would be returned
-'

Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d at 689-90.
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to democratic political processes at the state and local level - with
the power of the judiciary held in reserve to remedy serious violations of the even-handedness principle.
Several specific lines of cases could be resolved with remarkable
ease under a standard of even-handedness. The school aid cases, for
example, would not even present a serious controversy so long as
the government offered comparable aid to any religious school, irrespective of the identity of the religion which sponsored it. The
moment-of-silence cases would be even simpler. A statute which provides for (and, in application, is used to provide) a moment in which
students may engage in any quiet, contemplative activity of their
choice is of the essence of even-handedness. (Indeed, as we discussed, supra, such a statute should not pose any constitutional
problem even under the Lemon test, provided a judge was not guilty
of conflating legislative purpose with the motives of individual legislators.) Cases involving equal access to school facilities by student
groups (including religious groups) would have an equally obvious
resolution.
One area which would remain thorny, although not for strictly
constitutional reasons, would be cases of non-compulsory school
prayer. Compulsory school prayer is clearly a violation of the free
exercise clause. While it is no violation of a person's free exercise
rights to be exposed to (even uncongenial) religious views, it is a
violation to be compelled to participate in any religious exercises,
congenial or not. Even non-compulsory school prayer, however, has
practical implications which are absent from cases involving the content of textbooks, teacher lectures, and the like. The latter cases
involve educative activities; school prayer, by contrast, is a reverential activity.
There is a great gulf between those two classes of activity which
highlights the questionable wisdom of instituting officially-sponsored
school prayers, even when students are not compelled to participate
in them. The function of the public schools is educative, not reverential. The educative function is served by teaching children about
the beliefs and practices of different religions (and other belief systems). The educative function is neither advanced nor retarded by
allowing individual or collective reverential activities to be engaged 60
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in by students on their own initiative - e.g., an individual student
saying grace before a cafeteria lunch or a group of students meeting
in a classroom (under the same restrictions to which other student
organizations are subject) to study the Koran, partake of a seder
dinner, or participate in a mass. But the official sponsorship of a
reverential activity takes a school beyond its educative function into
an area where it has no expertise and places it in the awkward
position of either genuinely engaging in a form of worship or else
falsifying the very activity which it is promoting.
The qualms which arise about such employment of school authority are more likely to have their origin in prudential than constitutional concerns. We would concede that a program of officially
sponsored non-compulsory school prayer need not in principle violate either the free exercise clause or a standard of even-handedness
with respect to religion. However, in practice, it seems probable that
many such programs would. And if prayers used in the program
had any very distinctive religious content (e.g., an invocation of
Jesus), the principle of even-handedness would require, at the very
least, official sponsorship of other prayers, or some equally distinctive reverential activities, for the benefit of students whose religions do not accept the divinity of Christ. On the whole, where
real prayer is at issue (as distinguished from pious civic platitudes
cast in a form of petition or thanksgiving), public schools would
be well-advised to eschew any form of official sponsorship.
Although we have focused our attention principally on establishment clause controversies which arise in the field of public education, the principle of even-handedness in religious matters is
obviously susceptible of much broader application. We would assert
that, in any area of application, it should produce fairer and more
consistent results than conventional establishment clause doctrine.
And its lack of rootedness in the Constitution is no more pronounced or scandalous than the lack of rootedness of the conventional doctrine. Indeed, those who adhere to the plain meaning of
the establishment clause but who are willing to accept the prevailing
understanding of the equal protection clause can root the principle
of even-handedness in the fourteenth amendment with a perfectly
clear conscience. If, therefore, we are not prepared as a political
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society to be bound by our written Constitution, let us at least insist
upon the exercise of moral and political wisdom by those who, for
better or worse, have the institutional power to shape the accepted
meaning of the Constitution. Let us insist upon the elevation to
effective constitutional status of this principle of even-handedness
in matters of religion.
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